Penn State Law Review

Volume 124

Issue 2

Article 1

4-1-2020

Class Action and Aggregate Litigation: A Comparative
International Analysis
D. Brooks Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/pslr

Recommended Citation
Smith, D. Brooks (2020) "Class Action and Aggregate Litigation: A Comparative International Analysis,"
Penn State Law Review: Vol. 124 : Iss. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/pslr/vol124/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at Penn State Law
eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State Law Review by an authorized editor of Penn State Law
eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.

Articles:

Class Action and Aggregate Litigation: A
Comparative International Analysis
D. Brooks Smith*
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the American class action through a
comparative lens, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages relative
to three collective action devices from England and Wales: the
representative action, the Group Litigation Order, and the Competition
Appeal Tribunal action. Five insights emerge. First, the Article tracks the
rise of “professional objectors” in the U.S. and proposes ways England can
curb similar abuses. Second, the Article excavates the potential for
collusion between American class representatives, counsel, and
defendants, and identifies ways England can avoid the same perverse
incentives. Third, the Article details problematic examples of cy pres
*This Article was originally delivered as a lecture at a Continuing Legal Education
program led by Waynesburg University’s Stover Center for Constitutional Studies and
Moral Leadership in Cambridge, England on July 29, 2019. It is reproduced here with
minimal alteration. In agreeing to its publication, Judge Smith expresses his deep gratitude
to Gillian Schroff, Esquire, for her extensive research into aggregate litigation devices
currently available in Britain and Wales, and for her diligence and enduring patience in
working with him on numerous drafts that preceded presentation of the lecture and its
publication. Any errors that appear—be they plain, clear, or even reversible—are the sole
responsibility of Judge Smith.
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settlements in America as a cautionary tale for England, which recently
expanded reliance on cy pres relief in consumer regulatory suits. Fourth,
the Article grapples with the uniquely American issue of “strike suits”—
meritless putative class actions filed for their settlement value—and
applauds steps England has taken to avoid similar misuse. Fifth, the Article
discusses the evolving U.S. jurisprudence on class action waivers with an
eye to reform in both systems. In the end, the Article hopes to help jurists
and litigants on both sides of the Atlantic attain a more efficient and
effective system of aggregate litigation.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Good morning. It is great to be back with all of you. Last year at this
gathering, I decided to take on the topic of legislative redistricting, or to
employ the pejorative, “gerrymandering.” I expected that by the time we
had convened here in Cambridge in 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court would
have provided guidance on the subject. Instead, the Court decided to wait
me out. Well, as the old adage goes, “fool me once . . . .” So I decided
some months ago that this year I would talk about a jurisprudential subject
that has long intrigued me: the U.S. class action device and complex
litigation. Specifically, I intend to discuss a few of the problems that have
arisen in U.S. class actions and draw some connections between the U.S.
class action and collective actions here in England and Wales.
In 1974, Supreme Court Justice William Douglas encapsulated the
value of a class action, explaining:
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I think in our society that is growing in complexity there are bound to
be innumerable people in common disasters, calamities, or ventures
who would go begging for justice without the class action but who
could with all regard to due process be protected by it. Some of these
are consumers whose claims may seem de minimis but who alone have
no practical recourse for either remuneration or injunctive relief. Some
may be environmentalists who have no photographic development
plant about to be ruined because of air pollution by radiation but who
suffer perceptibly by smoke, noxious gases, or radiation. Or the
unnamed individual may be only a ratepayer being excessively
charged by a utility or a homeowner whose assessment is slowly rising
beyond his ability to pay. The class action is one of the few legal
remedies the small claimant has against those who command the status
quo.1

More recently, it has been explained that the “central rationale for the
class action aggregation” is that it “enables plaintiffs to exploit the
‘economies of scale’ the defendant already naturally enjoys from treating
separate claims as a single litigation unit” and thereby prevents “the
defendant from using the plaintiffs’ numerosity against them.”2 As
explained by Judge Posner:
The class action is an ingenious procedural innovation that enables
persons who have suffered a wrongful injury, but are too numerous for
joinder of their claims alleging the same wrong committed by the same
defendant or defendants to be feasible, to obtain relief as a group, a
class as it is called. The device is especially important when each claim
is too small to justify the expense of a separate suit, so that without a
class action there would be no relief, however meritorious the claims.3

That being said, there can be no doubt that the U.S. class action
device also presents risks that can, and have at times, damaged the
integrity of the judicial process. As noted by Congress in the 2005 Class
Action Fairness Act, “[c]lass action lawsuits are an important and valuable
part of the legal system when they permit the fair and efficient resolution
of legitimate claims of numerous parties,” but “there have been abuses of
the class action device that have – (A) harmed class members with
legitimate claims and defendants that have acted responsibly; (B)
adversely affected interstate commerce; and (C) undermined public
respect for our judicial system.”4
1. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 185–86 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting
in part).
2. Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in
Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1380–81, 1383 (2000).
3. Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2014).
4. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, and 1711–15 (2005)).
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Although I’m not aware of a data bank that currently maintains
statistics as to the number of putative class actions filed in the United
States each year,5 filings certainly number in the thousands.6 Indeed, in the
one category of putative class action filings that is closely monitored—
federal securities class actions—403 putative class actions were filed in
federal court in 2018 alone.7 The same study reports that, since 1996,
settlements in securities class actions alone have reached a total of over
$99 billion.8 One would hope that the vast majority of these are
meritorious claims and good faith settlements, but we know that at least
some are not.
And our class action device has often been viewed with skepticism
on this side of the Atlantic.9 Based on the potential for abuse and the vast
sums involved in U.S. class actions, outsiders looking in (including our
friends here in England) also have reason to view the U.S.-style class
action with concern.10 To be sure, a liberal class action device offers many
potential advantages. And the trend seems to be that European countries
are borrowing certain features of the U.S. model.11 As explained by two
distinguished experts in the class action field: “Once decried as the
perversity of rapacious Americans, class actions are now the focus of

5. Deborah R. Hensler, From Sea to Shining Sea: How and Why Class Actions Are
Spreading Globally, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 965, 985 (2017) (noting that “no jurisdiction
publishes official statistics on the number of complaints filed in which plaintiff seek to
proceed collectively” and “[n]o one knows how many class actions are filed annually in
federal or state courts in the United States”).
6. Id. at 986–87 (citing Deborah R. Hensler, Can Private Class Actions Enforce
Marketplace Regulations? Do They? Should They?, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND
REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL REGULATORY PROCESS (Francesca Bignami &
David Zaring eds., 2016)) (noting author’s previous estimate that approximately 6,500
class action complaints were filed in 2007).
7. Stanford Law Sch., Filings by Year: Federal Securities Class Action Litigation
1996 – YTD, SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, https://stanford.io/2lKqGtc (last visited
Dec. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Clearinghouse Filings 1996–YTD].
8. Stanford Law Sch., Key Stats: Box scores or key statistics from 1996 to YTD, SEC.
CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, https://stanford.io/2lUzBZ5 (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).
9. Neil H. Andrews, Fundamentals of Multi-Party or Collective Litigation 16 (Univ.
of Cambridge Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 21/2014, 2014), https://bit.ly/2mlLZSl
(noting the “xenophobic fear of the USA system” in the UK, and explaining that “[t]he fear
is strong in the United Kingdom but rises to terror in some Member States of the European
Union”).
10. As Lord Denning has stated, “[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant
drawn to the United States.” See Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch [1983] 1 WLR
730 at 733 (Eng.); see also Shinthean Ng, Class Action (Not US-Style): Enhancing Access
to Justice, 6 MANCHESTER REV. L. CRIME & ETHICS 49, 53 (2017) (“Despite the argument
that class action provides greater access to the courts, it is frequently criticized for creating
an unsavoury litigation culture, as is the case in the US jurisdiction.”).
11. See Hensler, supra note 5, at 966, 967 tbl.1 (noting that as of 2017, thirty-seven
jurisdictions in addition to the U.S. adopted some sort of class action procedure, including
fifteen countries in Europe).
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significant reform efforts in many European countries.”12 In developing
their own class action system, England and Wales have moved hesitantly
toward adopting some elements of the U.S. system, while imposing
additional safeguards and restrictions aimed at preventing some of the
abuses in the U.S. system.
In the time allotted me, I will briefly describe the U.S. class action
system and its counterpart in England and Wales. I will then explore some
of the hurdles we have faced in the U.S. and, based on our experience, try
to provide some insight into how England and Wales might avoid some of
the problems we have experienced. As one academic has put it, “[t]here is
no reason to believe that the whole ‘Yankee package’”—warts and all—
need “invade a foreign system through the window opened by the class
action device.”13
II.

U.S. CLASS ACTION SYSTEM

As some of you may know, class actions are governed by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Rule has antecedents that reach all the
way back to 1842 and Equity Rule 48.14 And most scholars agree that the
roots of the class action lie with the “bill of peace,” an equitable device
that developed here on British soil. But it is Rule 23, as amended in 1966,
that embodies the modern class action as we know it.
The first major step for a plaintiff in pursuing any class action is to
satisfy the prerequisites under Rule 23(a). Those are (1) Numerosity – that
the class is sufficiently large to justify class treatment, rather than
proceeding by another procedural device, such as joinder; (2)
Commonality – that there are material questions of law or fact common to
the class; (3) Typicality – that the claims of the representative parties align
with the claims of the absent class members; and (4) Adequacy – that the
representative parties are capable of “fairly and adequately” representing
and protecting the interests of the class.15 The judge to whom the class
action has been assigned must determine that all four requirements have
been proven.
Rule 23(b) provides for three types of class actions, so the second
major determination to be made in any class action is deciding the
appropriate class type for the claims at issue. The named plaintiff or
plaintiffs will ordinarily plead in a complaint—as well as in a motion to
certify a class—which of these types should be certified.
12. Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to
Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 177, 179 (2009).
13. Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil – A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM.
J. COMP. L. 311, 322 (2003).
14. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987).
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
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First, Rule 23(b)(1) provides for use of the class action device where
class treatment is necessary to prevent inconsistent judgments against the
defendant, or to ensure that absent class members’ rights are protected,
such as in a limited fund case where all claims cannot be satisfied in whole.
For example, some of you may recall the massive silicone-gel breast
implant litigation of the 1990s. 21,000 cases were consolidated into a
multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) in the Northern District of Alabama.16
Claims against one defendant manufacturer, Inamed, were certified under
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) as a settlement-only class.17 Approximately 15,000
claims had been filed against Inamed,18 and the historic settlement value
of the claims against the company was on average $18,500 per claim.19
This amounted to a total liability of nearly $280 million. But Inamed had
a negative valuation of $1.7 million.20 The District Judge explained, “the
costs and risks of individual breast implant claims greatly exceed Inamed’s
limited resources, which would soon be exhausted if individual litigation
were allowed to continue, and . . . Inamed therefore constitutes a ‘limited
fund’ against which claims are properly subject to class certification under
Rule 23(b)(1)(B).”21
Second, Rule 23(b)(2) provides for class-wide injunctive or
declaratory relief. This class type was created mostly out of a desire to
provide redress in civil rights cases. Indeed, the 1966 drafting committee
expressly identified civil rights cases as “illustrative” of the type of action
where the 23(b)(2) class mechanism will apply.22 By nature, class actions
under both Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) are mandatory. That means that all
class members must remain part of the class, since a class-wide judgment
is the only way to successfully bind them all. Anything less would result
in the types of inconsistent verdicts those class types are designed to avoid.
Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) establishes what is generally considered the
quintessential U.S. class action, and its adoption was a major innovation.
A product of the 1966 amendments, it allows for a damages class action
on an opt-out basis, and is now the most popular form of class action in
the U.S.23 And it’s the class-type primarily relevant to our discussions
today. Because the claims underlying Rule 23(b)(3) class actions could

16. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:97-CV-11441-RDP,
2010 WL 11506713, at *2 (N.D. Ala. May 19, 2010). For more on the MDL device, see
infra text accompanying notes 37–44.
17. Id. at *10.
18. Id. at *2.
19. Id. at *3.
20. Id.
21. Id. at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the certification order, ECF
No. 59 at ¶ 4).
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
23. See Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY
L.J. 1569, 1619 n.304 (2016).
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instead be pursued on an individual basis, additional requirements must be
satisfied before a class will be certified under that provision; the due
process rights of individual class members must be protected. Specifically,
a class representative must also establish that the questions of law or fact
common to the class predominate over any individual issues, and that the
class action device is superior to other methods of adjudicating the case.24
Additional notice requirements also apply to Rule 23(b)(3) class actions
to ensure that class members can exercise their opt-out rights on an
informed basis.25
Although not express within Rule 23, some courts have imposed a
so-called “ascertainability” requirement as part of the certification analysis
for a (b)(3) class action, meaning that the class must be clearly defined so
that members of the class can be identified.26 For example, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, on which I sit, requires that the class be
“defined with reference to objective criteria” and that there be “a reliable
and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative
class members fall within the class definition.”27 Other courts have implied
a more lenient standard, requiring only that the class be defined based on
clear, objective criteria, without any feasibility requirement.28 As an aside,
given the circuit-split on the standard for ascertainability, review by the
U.S. Supreme Court may be imminent. Or not. As you know, my
prognostication skills are less than stellar. But regardless of whether a
stricter or more lenient standard is appropriate, some level of
ascertainability must exist.29 Quite simply, the class action device will not
be appropriate if significant individual fact-finding will be necessary to
determine whether someone is even a member of the class.30 Given the
opt-out nature of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, the ascertainability
requirement is also necessary to ensure that class members can be given

24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
26. E.g., City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 439
(3d Cir. 2017); Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015).
27. See City Select Auto Sales Inc., 867 F.3d at 439.
28. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657–58.
29. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.222 (2004) (“Although the
identity of individual class members need not be ascertained before class certification, the
membership of the class must be ascertainable. Because individual class members must
receive the best notice practicable and have an opportunity to opt out, and because
individual damage claims are likely, Rule 23(b)(3) actions require a class definition that
will permit identification of individual class members . . . .”).
30. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012) (“If class
members are impossible to identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or
‘mini-trials,’ then a class action is inappropriate.”).
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adequate notice of their opt-out rights.31 All of this makes the certification
process for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions very rigorous.
Apart from the standard Rule 23(b) certification process, Rule 23(e)
also allows for class certification for the sole purpose of settlement. These
so-called settlement-only classes have become increasingly popular in the
last few decades. Under Rule 23(e), the parties must provide notice of the
proposed settlement to the class.32 In traditional A v. B litigation, a
presiding judge has no formal role in settlement. But in a class action,
because the court acts as something of a fiduciary for absent class
members,33 the judge must conduct a hearing to determine whether the
settlement proposal is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”34 Class members,
having received notice of a proposed settlement, also have the opportunity
to file objections to the settlement.35 If the court approves settlement of a
class action—or if the case otherwise results in a judgment on the merits—
such a judgment will be binding on all class members in Rule 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2) class actions. In a Rule 23(b)(3) action, the judgment will have res
judicata effect for all class members who chose not to opt-out of the
class.36
We could spend all day discussing the many complexities of Rule 23.
We have already covered the grist of what would be the first three sessions
of the Class Action seminar I teach at Penn State Law. But for our purposes
today, my summary of Rule 23(a) and (b) is enough.
Before I turn to discussion of English collective actions, I want to
touch on another collective action procedure in the United States, the
multidistrict litigation, or MDL. MDLs, while perhaps not provoking the
same level of discussion and debate as class actions, have quietly become
a dominant force in federal civil litigation. Indeed, one source reports that,
for the first time, a majority of all pending civil cases in federal court—
52%—were in MDLs in fiscal year 2018.37 This is a huge development.
The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation reports that 156,511
31. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]scertainability
and a clear class definition allow potential class members to identify themselves for
purposes of opting out of a class.”).
32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1).
33. See, e.g., Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 594 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he
District Court evaluates the agreement as a fiduciary for absent class members. The reason
for judicial approval is to ensure that other unrepresented parties (absent class members)
and the public interest are fairly treated by the settlement reached between the class
representatives and the defendants.” (citations omitted)); 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL.,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:40 (5th ed. 2011 & Supp. 2019) (“[T]he court’s role as
fiduciary is primarily to ensure that the class’s own agents – its class representatives and
class counsel – have not sold out its interests in settling the case.”).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5).
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3).
37. Dave Simpson, MDLs Surge To Majority Of Entire Federal Civil Caseload,
LAW360 (Mar. 14, 2019, 10:54 PM), https://bit.ly/2FdxQfK.
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cases were pending in MDL actions as of September 30, 2018.38 By June
19th of 2019, that number had fallen slightly to 141,721 pending actions.39
By comparison, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
reported 339,313 total pending civil cases in federal courts in 2018.40 This
represents a tectonic shift in the processing of federal civil cases, so any
discussion of U.S. collective actions would be incomplete without a brief
note as to how MDLs work.
MDLs are a product of statute, rather than a procedural device
available under the civil rules. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 created a seven-judge
judicial panel on multidistrict litigation to administer the process. Under
section 1407, when there are multiple civil actions on the same topic
pending in different districts, the panel may consolidate and transfer the
cases to a single district for coordinated pretrial proceedings before one
judge. The MDL process may be initiated either by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation acting sua sponte or by a party who believes that
MDL treatment may be appropriate for their case.41 Like class actions, the
MDL process is designed to “promote the just and efficient conduct” of
complex actions,42 and all cases subject to an MDL order will be bound by
the MDL judge’s rulings. But the MDL process is about coordination, so
unlike class actions, MDL rulings do not bind non-parties. Each plaintiff
must still file his or her own individual claim and the cases are simply
consolidated for coordinated proceedings on the common pretrial issues.
Also unlike class actions, the MDL process does not resolve the merits of
the claims at issue. Instead, cases are consolidated only for pretrial
proceedings. After resolving as many pretrial matters as possible, the
transferee judge remands the cases to the districts in which they were
originally filed. That’s where any further proceedings and final resolution
take place.43 Notably, though, the class action device is often used
alongside an MDL. It is not uncommon to see claims that have been
consolidated in an MDL also certified as a class as part of the MDL
proceedings, and often for settlement purposes.44

38. J.P.M.L., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION UNDER 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 – FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 3 (2018), https://bit.ly/2kPs4KR.
39. J.P.M.L., MDL STATISTICS REPORT – DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS
BY DISTRICT 5 (2019), https://bit.ly/2kkAFFc.
40. Table C–U.S. District Courts – Civil Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S.
CTS., https://bit.ly/2lTV5FD. (last visited Dec. 22, 2019).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
43. See id.
44. See Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict
Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669,
1695–96 (2017).
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III. UK (ENGLAND AND WALES) CLASS ACTION SYSTEM
Next, I’ll turn briefly to the collective action options that are available
in England and Wales. Our systems are quite different, but there are some
evident similarities. And, as I’ve noted, it seems that England has looked
to, and moved toward, the U.S.-style class action—but with caution.45
Understandably, England has sought to avoid what are considered some
of the excesses of the U.S. class action system.46 At the same time,
however, England has not experienced some of the benefits accompanying
a liberal, opt-out class action regime.47 The Consumer Rights Act of 2015,
and with it the creation of a collective action device, was potentially a step
toward providing some of those benefits in the consumer/anti-competitive
business context.48 But a true English class action? As American lawyers
and judges know it, it has yet to arrive.
A.

“Traditional” Forms of Multi-Party Litigation

It is important to recognize that traditional forms of multi-party
litigation remain a useful tool in England. Under English civil rules, any
number of claimants or litigants may be joined as parties.49 For example,
in a 2005 case, 50,000 shareholders were joined together as full parties to
the proceeding.50 While we’ve used this same aggregation tool in the
45. See Rachael P. Mulheron, Some Difficulties with Group Litigation Orders – and
Why a Class Action is Superior, 24 C.J.Q. 40, 58 (2005) (“The class action device, as
practised elsewhere . . . , seems to have been viewed with some trepidation by several
senior English judiciary and academics alike . . . .”); see also Hensler, supra note 5, at 968
(“Because the modern class action was first adopted in the United States and because most
jurisdictions that have adopted the class action in the last decade refer to the ‘American
class action’ as a model, if not to emulate then to avoid, it is reasonable to view class actions
outside the United States as ‘legal transplants.’”).
46. Neil H. Andrews, Multi-Party Actions and Complex Litigation in England, 23
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012) (“There are dangers in adopting an ‘opt out’ system:
potentially aggressive attempts to bring collective litigation; the prospect of very large
gains being made by law firms; the fear of commercial and public entities being exposed
to expensive and protracted litigation; inevitable increases in the cost of potential
defendants’ defensive measures; in particular, consumers and businesses paying more for
insurance cover.”).
47. Mulheron, supra note 45, at 68 (“[T]he opt-out approach favoured by the great
majority of class action regimes provides innumerable advantages that would further the
[English Civil Procedure Rules’] overriding objective.”); see also Vicki Waye, Advantages
and Disadvantages of Class Action Litigation (And Its Alternatives), 24 NZBLQ 109, 109
(2018) (“Without an effective collective redress mechanism small claims may be
uneconomical to pursue, those that cause mass harm thereby escape responsibility and
scarce legal decision making resources are inefficiently deployed. Individualised legal
determinations of similar matters can also lead to inconsistent outcomes, and consequently
undermine the coherence and integrity of the justice system.”); Ng, supra note 10, at 54
(“In order to see an increase in collective actions by consumers, some type of class action
has to exist.”).
48. See Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15, § 47 (UK).
49. See CPR 19.1 (UK); see also Andrews, supra note 46, at 14.
50. Weir v. Sec’y of State for Transp. [2005] EWHC (Ch) 2192 (Eng.).
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United States,51 a class action or multidistrict litigation is generally the
preferred method when the number of litigants becomes unwieldy. In
England, perhaps because turning to a different collective action procedure
was not always possible, joinder procedures are more evolved. It is
common for a joined group of claimants or defendants, such as the 50,000
shareholders I just noted, to form an action committee to coordinate
litigation.52 In a 2013 case, 104 claimants (represented by two law firms)
joined together under a cooperation agreement to obtain a 52 million euro
award.53 Action committees and cooperation agreements are also common
in formal collective actions in the United States, but are typically not seen
in cases involving joinder alone.
So-called “test” cases, or bellwether trials, have also been a useful
tool in England to produce “class-wide” res judicata.54 Those are cases in
which a single A v. B case is tried in order to test the viability of, and obtain
judgment on, claims that are relevant to a group of litigants. Bellwether
trials are common in the United States as well, but they are generally used
in the context of formal collective actions. For example, there are currently
bellwether trials scheduled in the opioid MDL pending in the Northern
District of Ohio.55
B.

Representative Actions

Representative actions are the original mechanism for formal group
litigation in England. These actions were in use in England prior to the
adoption of Rule 23 in the United States. The representative action
procedure is codified in English Civil Procedure Rule 19.6. Under this
Rule, where multiple claimants have the same interest, a claimant may act
as a representative for others having the same interest.56 Any judgment or
order obtained when using this procedure is binding on all represented
individuals, and it can be enforced by non-parties with permission of the
court.57 This procedure resembles a U.S. class action in that party
claimants act on behalf of a class of non-party claimants, and the non-party
claimants will be bound by the judgment. The procedure also includes a
means by which non-party claimants may opt-out. Represented nonparties are automatically bound by any judgment or order, whether or not

51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19–20.
52. Andrews, supra note 46, at 13.
53. See Michael Brown & Elizabeth Clay, The English Class Action?, FINANCIER
WORLDWIDE (Oct. 2015), http://bit.ly/2keog5L.
54. RACHAEL P. MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 102–03 (2004); Andrews, supra note 46, at 2–3.
55. Sarah Angelino & Stephen Copenhaver, Why Bellwethers Matter in the Opioid
MDL, LAW360 (June 10, 2019, 1:53 PM), http://bit.ly/2kynuAP.
56. CPR 19.6 (Eng.).
57. See id.
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they consent to the proceedings.58 But they can opt-out if they believe the
judgment or order should not be enforced against them by later petitioning
the court.
Compared to the U.S. model, representative actions present some
hurdles that have limited their effectiveness in practice.59 First, the
requirement that represented parties all share the “same interests” was
construed very strictly in the 1910 King’s Bench ruling in Markt & Co.
Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd.60 The holding of Markt still holds sway,
to some extent, and thereby burdens the representative action procedure to
this day.61 In that case, it was held that the “same interests” requirement is
satisfied only where the represented parties “enjoy[] identical contractual
relationships created under the same commercial exercise that gave rise to
a proportionate liability for a single identified loss.”62 The Court
specifically held that the “same interest” requirement is not satisfied where
different defenses may exist.63 “Although the modern trend is to give the
rule an increasingly liberal interpretation,”64 even relatively recent cases
have emphasized the need for “identity of interest.” Those cases have
rejected a representative action where different defenses applied to the
claims of represented parties, concluding that claimants do not have the
same interest where “the claim is not equally beneficial to all members of
the class” because some claims are limited by the defendant’s ability to
raise a defense.65 This narrow interpretation stems from two concerns:
binding non-parties who do not have an opportunity to litigate on their
own; and prejudicing defendants who could be prevented from raising a
defense that would bar claims by some represented individuals.66
Although the U.S. class action system has similarly faced issues of unique
individual interests or individual defenses arising in what are otherwise
common claims, the flexibility of Rule 23 has generally resolved these
issues through creation of subclasses or class actions that are limited to

58. See MULHERON, supra note 54, at 92–93; Andrews, supra note 46, at 14.
59. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 14–15 (explaining that “representative
proceedings remain distinctly marginal in England” and “[i]t is very rare for English
representative proceedings to culminate in a damages award in favour of the represented
class”).
60. See Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd. [1910] 2 KB 1021 at 1039
(Moulton LJ) (appeal taken from Eng.).
61. 7 CHRISTOPHER HODGES & STEFAAN VOET, DELIVERING COLLECTIVE REDRESS:
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 50 (2018).
62. Emerald Supplies Ltd. v. British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA (Civ) 1284 [48]
(Eng.) (emphasis added); see also Markt & Co. Ltd. [1910] 2 KB at 1026.
63. See Markt & Co. Ltd. [1910] 2 KB at 1030.
64. See Emerald Supplies Ltd. [2010] EWCA (Civ) at 1284 [4].
65. Id.
66. Id.; see also Markt & Co. Ltd. [1910] 2 KB at 1039.
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only certain issues. The rigidity of English representative actions has stood
in the way of such accommodative procedures.67
An example of this limitation on the representative action played out
recently in a case filed against Google. An advocacy group filed an action
on behalf of 4.4 million UK iPhone users, based on an alleged privacy
violation on the part of Google.68 The damages alleged were 1 to 3 billion
pounds.69 On August 10, 2018, the High Court dismissed the action,
concluding in part that “a representative action would not be legitimate
because those claimants who have suffered ‘damage’ would have different
interests from one another, dependent on the individual facts of their
case.”70 The court went on to note that “the individual claims are not viable
as stand-alone litigation, and [other forms of collective relief are]
impracticable, so that this representative action is in practice the only way
in which these claims can be pursued.”71 Based on a strict application of
the same-interest rule, the 4.4 million iPhone users were left without an
opportunity for collective redress, despite the fact that the alleged violation
by Google was committed in exactly the same way as to each user. As
stated by the attempted representative party: “There now seems no
alternative but for the government to fill this gap by legislating to give
groups of consumers the right to affordable collective redress.”72
Second, a significant hurdle for many potential claimants is that the
representative party in a representative action must alone bear all of the
costs of litigation, including fee-shifting if the representative party loses.73
Having to personally bear costs plainly discourages someone from taking
on what could be burdensome litigation on behalf of non-parties who are
otherwise represented. These non-parties essentially enjoy a free-ride on
the representative’s time and financial investment.74 This is especially
problematic in consumer cases where each individual claimant’s damages
are small and therefore no claimant is sufficiently motivated to bring a
claim in the face of the cost and risk of litigation.75 In U.S. litigation, we
67. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (“When appropriate, an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(5) (“When appropriate, a class may be divided into subclasses that are each treated
as a class under this rule.”); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 184 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (“The purpose of Rule 23 is to provide flexibility in the
management of class actions, with the trial court taking an active role in the conduct of the
litigation.”).
68. See Lloyd v. Google LLC [2018] EWHC (QB) 2599 [2], [4] (Eng.).
69. Id. at [4].
70. Id. at [89].
71. Id. at [103].
72. Alex Hern, UK High Court Blocks Mass Privacy Action Against Google,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2018, 9:47 AM), https://bit.ly/2yavCL8.
73. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 16.
74. See Brown & Clay, supra note 53.
75. See, e.g., Emerald Supplies Ltd. v. British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA (Civ)
1284 [5] (Eng.) (“Consumer claims for overcharging are given as an example of a case in
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call these “negative-value” suits because the cost of investigating the harm
and seeking legal redress is higher than any potential recovery.76 As my
friends Professor Issacharoff and Dean Klonoff have written, “the most
important element in ensuring justice is making sure that some agent –
dare we say, any agent – will rise to the occasion to take up the case.”77
Given the risks involved for a representative under the English system, this
key step is unlikely to occur.
C.

Group Litigation Orders

To remedy some of the restrictive characteristics of representative
actions and create something that more closely resembles a U.S. class
action, England introduced Group Litigation Orders (“GLO”) in 2000,
codified at Civil Procedure Rule 19.10.78 Since that time, Group Litigation
Orders have been the primary tool for bringing collective actions.79
“The key features and normal effect of any GLO,” as the device is
known, have been described as follows:


it identifies the common issues which are a pre-condition for
participation in a GLO;



it provides for the establishment and maintenance of a register of
GLO claims;



it gives the managing court wide powers of case management,
including the selection of test claims and the appointment of a lead
solicitor for the claimants or the defendants, as appropriate;



it provides for judgments on test claims to be binding on the other
parties on the group register; and



it makes special provision for costs orders.80

Unlike representative actions, the GLO system is an opt-in system in
which each member of the group is a party to the proceedings and must
prove individual loss.81 In that way, the GLO regime resembles MDL

which each person’s damage is small, but a representative action may not be very useful:
although many people are affected by legal wrongdoing, that may not be to a sufficient
extent to motivate any one of them to commence an action against the wrongdoers.”
(citation omitted)).
76. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Law, Culture, and Incentives, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1895, 1900–01 (2017).
77. Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1186 (2009).
78. Ng, supra note 10, at 52.
79. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 21.
80. Autologic Holdings PLC v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue [2005] 3 CMLR 2 [86]
(Eng.); see also Andrews, supra note 46, at 21–22.
81. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 22.
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practice in the U.S.82 The opt-in GLO system eliminates some of the
concerns underlying the “same interest” representative action requirement
because there is no risk of binding unknowing non-parties to the judgment.
Also, defendants will be able to raise any applicable defenses against each
claimant. Accordingly, claims governed by a GLO need only “give rise to
common or related issues of fact or law.”83 The opt-in system also allows
for costs to be shared across the group, which helps to relieve the cost–
benefit problem attendant to representative actions.84
GLOs do have their drawbacks. Any opt-in system has its
limitations.85 There can be no global peace following such a collective
action because potential claimants who choose not to opt in are always
free to pursue their individual claims.86 And because individuals can
choose to pursue their own claims, the efficiency purposes of collective
actions are limited. Thus a GLO does not eliminate the need for repetitious
actions.87 Further, an opt-in procedure requires claimants to take
affirmative steps to obtain relief—steps the claimant may be unable or
unwilling to take for many of the same reasons that a claimant may decline
to take individual action.88 So access to justice is limited by an opt-in class
device.
While the GLO option provides for more liberal group litigation than
does a representative action, and is in fact the primary collective action
tool in England and Wales, in practice it has not been employed nearly as
often as the U.S. class action. Not even close. As of May 2018, there had
been only 105 GLOs in the 18 years since the procedure was introduced.89
Compare that with the rate of putative class action filings in the United
82. See Hensler, supra note 5, at 979–80 (noting that GLOs in England “play[] a
similar role” to MDLs).
83. CPR 19.10 (Eng.).
84. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 21.
85. See Estelle Hurter, Opting in or opting out in class action proceedings: from
principles to pragmatism?, 50 DE JURE 60, 74 (2017), https://bit.ly/2kMHS11 (“[O]pt-in
regimes do not promote inclusivity, and an under-inclusive class does not ensure access to
justice for all of the individuals who fall within the class definition.”).
86. See Mulheron, supra note 45, at 54–55 (“[U]nder an opt-in regime, the defendant
loses some degree of comfort in knowing how many of these individual proceedings it is
possible to face.”).
87. Id. at 54 (explaining that “[a] multiplicity of litigation is not necessarily avoided”
in GLO proceedings); see also Ng, supra note 10, at 55 (noting that opt-out systems have
a much higher participation rate than opt-in systems).
88. See Mulheron, supra note 45, at 54 (“[T]here are various barriers, whether they
be economic (e.g. too poor to afford any legal assistance), psychological (e.g. afraid of
backlash from the defendant if one is seen to join a group action) or social (e.g. immigrants
with a poor knowledge of English or of English legal systems), that discourage or prevent
affirmative action being taken to opt in.”); see also Waye, supra note 47, at 116 (“There is
little incentive for claimants with small claims to initiate an individual claim or to join the
GLO register where the costs of taking such action outweigh the value of their claim.”).
89. Guidance: Group Litigation Orders, GOV.UK, https://bit.ly/2kEy759 (last updated
Dec. 26, 2019).

318

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 124:2

States, where in 2018 alone—and only in the field of federal securities
litigation—403 class actions were filed.90 Between state and federal court,
the total number of putative class actions filed in the U.S. since 2000 likely
falls somewhere in the tens of thousands.91 The relatively low number of
GLOs could be due in part to the extensive case management required in
a GLO, including the need for initial ratification by the court.92 But to the
extent the low number of GLOs indicates that consumers and other injured
parties are not generally able to secure relief on a class-wide basis,93 it
could be argued that the GLO procedure has serious deficiencies.94
D.

Competition Appeal Tribunal Collective Proceedings

The newest form of collective action in England and Wales—and the
form that most closely resembles a U.S.-style class action—is the
collective proceeding before the Competition Appeal Tribunal, which I
will refer to as a “CAT” collective action. The CAT collective action was
introduced in Section 47 of the Consumer Rights Act of 2015.95 Although
CAT collective actions may be either opt-in or opt-out at the discretion of
the Competition Appeal Tribunal, the CAT procedure provides the first
English opt-out class action device with class-wide relief and the
opportunity for class-wide aggregate damages.96 Unlike the U.S. class
action system, however, CAT collective actions can be used only for the
limited purpose of challenging anti-competitive conduct under the
Competition Act of 1998.97 And, as indicated by the name, such collective
proceedings may be adjudicated only before the Competition Appeal
Tribunal.98

90. Clearinghouse Filings 1996–YTD, supra note 7.
91. Cf. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their
Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 816–30 (2010) (identifying 688 federal
class action settlements in 2006 and 2007). See generally Jonah B. Gelbach & Deborah R.
Hensler, What We Don’t Know About Class Actions But Hope to Know Soon, 87 FORDHAM
L. REV. 65 (2018) (describing ongoing efforts to calculate the total number of class actions
annually).
92. See CPR 19.11 (Eng.); see also Andrews, supra note 46, at 16.
93. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 24 (“The English GLO figures (an ‘opt in’ system)
are perhaps disconcerting if one takes an absolutist approach to ‘access to justice.’”); see
also Ng, supra note 10, at 52 (explaining that “[t]he opt-in requirement attached to GLOs
means that they are unlikely to be used for cases involving mass consumer losses where
individuals face significant barriers to ‘opting-in’”).
94. See Mulheron, supra note 45, at 40 (“[T]he opt-in approach adopted by the GLO
regime is less than satisfactory, is wasteful of litigants’ resources, and is beset with
problems.”).
95. Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15, § 47 (UK).
96. See Rachael P. Mulheron, The United Kingdom’s New Opt-Out Class Action, 37
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 814, 816 (2017).
97. Competition Act 1998, c. 4, § 47A(2) (UK); see also Mulheron, supra note 96, at
816.
98. Competition Act 1998, c. 4, § 47A(1) (UK).
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CAT collective actions may be brought by either a class member who
acts as a class representative or by what is called an “ideological claimant”
who is not a class member but is otherwise a suitable representative.99 This
is in part based on the fact that CAT collective actions arise in the context
of anti-competition laws. UK lawmakers wanted to include as potential
representatives trade associations and consumer associations that already
represent consumers and are well-positioned to assert claims arising under
the Competition Act.100 The “ideological claimant” serves a purpose
similar to a U.S. plaintiff with organizational standing in that the
ideological claimant, while not having its own claim, has some direct
interest in the class proceedings due to its association with the individuals
who do have claims.101
A CAT collective action begins with a “collective proceeding order”
from the Competition Appeal Tribunal.102 Much like class certification in
the U.S., the Tribunal looks to various factors to determine whether the
action is appropriate for collective treatment. Specifically, the Tribunal
considers whether there is commonality between the class claims, whether
a collective proceeding is superior to other procedures, and whether there
is minimum numerosity.103 The Tribunal also looks to the preliminary
merits of the claim, the costs and benefits of bringing the claim as a
collective action, whether there is an adequate class definition, the need
for collective treatment, the general suitability of the case for collective
treatment, and the appropriateness of the representative claimant.104
Although most of these factors largely resemble the factors
considered for class certification in the U.S., the consideration of the
preliminary merits of the claim, in particular, may provide a degree of
scrutiny not present in the U.S. class certification process.105 In the United
States, the certification process is only a procedural step to determine
whether it is appropriate to apply the class action device. The merits of
the action are another matter. The merits of a claim may have some limited
relevance in the U.S. certification process,106 but a discussion of that would
get too “into the weeds” for our purposes today. Suffice it to say that the
99. Competition Act 1998, c. 4, § 47B(8) (UK).
100. See Mulheron, supra note 96, at 829.
101. For one example, see Dorothy Gibson v. Pride Mobility Prods. Ltd. [2017] CAT
9 (Eng.), where an ideological plaintiff—the General Secretary of the National Pensioners
Convention—brought a putative CAT collective action on behalf of seniors injured by anticompetitive practices related to mobility scooters.
102. Competition Act 1998, c. 4, § 47B(4) (UK).
103. See Mulheron, supra note 96, at 822–23.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 833–34.
106. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir.
2008) (“[T]he court must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to class certification,
even if they overlap with the merits – including disputes touching on elements of the cause
of action.”).
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merits alone are not a valid consideration in the U.S.107 As stated by one
UK class action expert, the goal of the CAT preliminary merits
consideration is to go beyond the normal standard for dismissal and target
“cases which are weak, but not so weak that they could be struck out.”108
In one case, the CAT explained that the class representative “had to do
more than simply show that he has an arguable case on the pleadings.”109
While the CAT certification criteria could help to ensure that only
proper, strong claims are certified for class treatment, and thereby avoid
some of the abuses of the U.S. system, they have thus far been applied so
strictly that, at last check, no collective proceeding order has yet been
issued. Indeed, the Competition Appeal Tribunal has considered only two
cases for certification.110 So while the CAT collective action appeared to
be a promising method of securing some of the benefits of a U.S.-style
class action, these benefits seem far from being realized.
But things may be changing. In April of 2019, the English Court of
Appeal overturned the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s refusal to certify a
claim and grant a collective proceedings order in a collective action claim
against Mastercard.111 One critic argued that the Court of Appeal went too
far in weakening the certification requirements for a CAT collective
action. She explained that “[i]f the appellate decision in the Mastercard
case is allowed to stand, the UK will have a system that is as bad, if not
worse, than the American system.”112 The UK Supreme Court has since
agreed to hear Mastercard’s appeal. The proper test for CAT collective
action certification— and perhaps the practical viability of a CAT
collective action—hangs in the balance.
IV. CHALLENGES FACED IN U.S. SYSTEM
By this point, I hope I’ve been clear that England has been cautious
in adopting aggregation procedures. Our friends here continue to look
upon the U.S. model with some suspicion. And that approach is probably
107. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013)
(“Merits questions may be considered to the extent – but only to the extent – that they are
relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are
satisfied.”); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974) (“We find
nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to
conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit, in order to determine whether it may
be maintained as a class action.”).
108. Mulheron, supra note 96, at 834.
109. Walter Hugh Merricks CBE v. Mastercard Inc. [2017] CAT 16 [57] (Eng.).
110. See id.; see also Dorothy Gibson v. Pride Mobility Prods. Ltd. [2017] CAT 9
(Eng.).
111. See Stephen Wisking et al., Court of Appeal Overturns CAT’s Refusal to Certify
the MasterCard Collective Action Claim, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 24, 2019),
http://bit.ly/2lUCAAB.
112. Lisa A. Rickard, Mastercard: Preventing a US-Style Litigation Monster, LAW
SOC’Y GAZETTE (July 3, 2019), http://bit.ly/2kezqr2.
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wise. There are aspects of the U.S. model to be avoided. But as England
seeks to enhance the benefits of aggregation by introducing procedures
that are increasingly similar to the U.S. collective action approach, the
country also opens the door to expanded (and sometimes abusive)
litigation. Having observed the U.S. class action system as it has
developed over a good many years, and having participated in that
development as a judge, I have some familiarity with the most problematic
elements of the system—and with its substantial benefits. Based on our
experience in the U.S., I see a few specific problems that English courts
and practitioners should try to avoid. The U.S. experience offers valuable
lessons, including lessons in what to avoid, and lessons in how to mitigate
certain excesses. In the next few minutes, I will review five challenges we
have faced in the U.S. system, and I’ll suggest how England might avoid
them.
A.

Objectors

First, I turn to the issue of objectors to class action settlements. To
repeat, parties to a class action may submit a settlement proposal and,
under Rule 23(e), “any class member may object to the proposal.”113 This
procedure is necessary because non-named class members are bound by
the settlement; they must have some opportunity to contest it.114 For the
same reason, non-party objectors can also appeal a District Court’s
judgment approving a settlement.115 As such, objectors are not inherently
problematic and can, in fact, be an asset to the class system by ensuring
that settlements are fair and adequately protect unnamed class members.116
But where there are objections, the judge overseeing the action must invest
additional time in hearings to determine if there is merit to the objections,
and such hearings necessarily add weeks—or even months—to the
approval process. Similarly, an appeal of a class settlement, even where
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(A).
114. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (“What is most important to this
case is that nonnamed class members are parties to the proceedings in the sense of being
bound by the settlement. It is this feature of class action litigation that requires that class
members be allowed to appeal the approval of a settlement when they have objected at the
fairness hearing. To hold otherwise would deprive nonnamed class members of the power
to preserve their own interests in a settlement that will ultimately bind them, despite their
expressed objections before the trial court.”).
115. See id. at 10–11 (“[A]ppealing the approval of the settlement is petitioner’s only
means of protecting himself from being bound by a disposition of his rights he finds
unacceptable and that a reviewing court might find legally inadequate.”).
116. See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or
Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 408–09 (2003) (“By definition, the
objector is a monitor, who is evaluating a proposed settlement and then investing resources
to either improve the settlement terms or reject the settlement. . . . Objectors create an
adversary contest, usually regarding the difficult process of settlement approval, and
thereby can perform a positive function.”).
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meritless, can add months or years to litigation, during which time
payment to the class and class counsel is delayed.
This has led one academic to note that “objectors may be the least
popular litigation participants in the history of civil procedure.”117 In fact,
they have been described as “warts on the class action process.”118 I
attended a symposium a few years ago where one of the speakers, a lawyer
involved in the massive NFL concussion litigation, referred to objectors
as “scum.” And as another critic has put it: “Objectors are as welcome in
the courtroom as is the guest at a wedding ceremony who responds
affirmatively to the minister’s question, ‘Is there anyone here who opposes
this marriage?”’119
But whether or not objectors are widely appreciated, the real problem
for courts and class litigants arises with so-called “professional
objectors.”120 In the U.S. system, these are attorneys who routinely
“oppose settlements on behalf of nonnamed class members and threaten
to file meritless appeals of the final judgment merely to extract a
payoff.”121 The delay accompanying an objection produces a powerful
incentive for class counsel to take steps to appease an objector, regardless
of the merits of the underlying objection. Knowing this, professional
objectors look for a quick payout.
Professional objectors free-ride on the efforts of class counsel, who
have invested substantial time and effort in successfully identifying a legal
claim and procuring a settlement,122 by extorting payments from class
counsel to avoid the delay and expense of an objection.123 After the
objectors receive their payout, they do not file the threatened objection or
appeal, or, where already filed, withdraw the objection or appeal. This sort
of objection adds little or nothing to the fairness of the class action
process—indeed, it raises serious questions about the efficiency and
integrity of the process. It also carries the potential to discourage lawyers
from initiating class actions and investing the effort necessary to reach
settlement, because they know that others who stood on the sidelines are
likely to get a piece of the settlement they worked to procure.124
117. Id. at 411.
118. Id.
119. Lawrence W. Schonbrun, The Class Action Con Game, REG., Fall 1997, at 50,
53, available at https://bit.ly/2EPlw5A.
120. Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 287, 375 (2003) (defining “professional objectors” as “a term used colloquially to
describe plaintiffs’ law firms that threaten objections largely as a means to obtain side
payments for themselves in exchange for their agreement either to drop the objections or
not to raise them in the first place”).
121. John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors: What
to Do About Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 865–66 (2012).
122. See Brunet, supra note 116, at 409.
123. See Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 865–67.
124. See Brunet, supra note 116, at 431–32.
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U.S. courts have also encountered cases in which the objection filed
is actually (or potentially) meritorious, but the person raising it has the
intent of merely extracting a payout from class counsel. Clearly, the
meritorious objection has not been used properly: The objector is not
motivated by a desire to benefit the class. For example, a potential objector
who has identified a genuine problem with a settlement may approach
class counsel prior to filing any objection in court, seeking a payout in
exchange for not lodging the objection.125 A court can’t consider an
objection that is never filed, and so a meritorious issue may evade review
with the result being approval of an unfair settlement.126 Similarly, if an
objector does in fact file a meritorious objection or appeal, but later
withdraws the claim, a court may never reach the merits of the issue. In
these instances, objections are not serving their proper purpose of
benefitting the class. They are, instead, being used solely for the benefit of
the objecting attorney.
Objecting can be lucrative. In one recent case, class counsel reports
that he paid a well-known serial objector $225,000 after his objection was
overruled.127 Quite simply, class counsel just wanted the objector to “go
away” and not hold up the settlement by taking an appeal.128 And by the
way, that objector is said to have filed 76 objections to class action
settlements over the years.129
A significant problem for both judges and class counsel in taking on
improper objectors is that there may be no evidence of impropriety on the
record. Some potential objectors contact class counsel informally and
threaten to raise an objection unless counsel provides a payout. Even
where an objection is actually filed, it is generally difficult to determine
whether an objection is intentionally baseless and improper, rather than
simply weak.130 One reason is that filed objections can be general. Such
“cookie cutter” objections will apply to any class settlement, such as an
objection that the attorney fee award in the settlement is too high or that
the total fund and per-class-member distributions are too low.131 There is
often insufficient evidence in the record to determine the intent of the
attorney filing the objection.132 And even routine objectors will sometimes
file a meritorious objection that adds value to the process, so the fact that
someone is a serial objector does not by itself mean that the objections are
125. See Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 882–83.
126. See id.
127. Michael J. Bologna, Notorious “Serial Objector” May Have Filed His Last
Objection (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 12, 2019, 8:42 AM), https://bit.ly/2sSYUym.
128. See id.
129. See Serial Objector Index BETA, SERIAL OBJECTOR INDEX,
http://bit.ly/2kigGXO (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).
130. Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 874–75.
131. See id. at 879.
132. See id. at 874–75.
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baseless.133 These factors make it difficult to regulate professional
objectors because genuine objectors are a key part of the class action
process, and it can be difficult, at least at first, to spot the difference
between a baseless, extortionate objection and a genuine, but ultimately
unsuccessful, objection. But what must be kept in mind is that an
objection—whether extortionate or genuine—slows the process. And time
means money.
As far as I know, England does not have a documented history of
“professional objectors.” But the collective action system here, in its
existing form, is not immune to the problem. Class litigators and the
judiciary need to be on-guard against this form of abuse. The problem is
most likely to arise in the new CAT proceedings because, under CAT
procedures, class members have the right to object to a settlement.134 As
in the U.S., this objection procedure can in many ways ensure the fairness
of a settlement. And, because England has not yet witnessed a certified
CAT class, the procedure has not progressed to settlement, where
objectors might have their day in court. But given the potential for abuse,
English jurists and practitioners would be well-advised to consider
adopting procedures that safeguard the settlement process generally and
protect it against manipulative objections, in particular.
In the U.S., various options have been proposed to curb abusive
objections. In fact, Rule 23 was amended at the end of 2018 with the hope
of curtailing the practice, if not eliminating it entirely. The amended Rule
includes two new procedures. First, the Rule is amended to require that
any objections be stated with specificity.135 The Civil Rules Committee
explained that this change will “enable the parties to respond to [the
objections] and the court to evaluate them.”136 This should help to prevent
professional objectors from filing generic objections without establishing
specific grounds arising out of the settlement at issue.
Second, under the amendment, “[u]nless approved by the court after
a hearing, no payment or other consideration may be provided in
connection with: (i) forgoing or withdrawing an objection, or (ii) forgoing,
dismissing, or abandoning an appeal from a judgment approving the
proposal.”137 As explained by the Rules Committee:
[S]ome objectors may be seeking only personal gain, and using
objections to obtain benefits for themselves rather than assisting in the
settlement-review process. At least in some instances, it seems that
objectors – or their counsel – have sought to obtain consideration for
withdrawing their objections or dismissing appeals from judgments
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See id. at 875.
See Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, SI 2015/1648, art. 94(7) (Eng.).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(A).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2018 amendment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(B).
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approving class settlements. And class counsel sometimes may feel
that avoiding the delay produced by an appeal justifies providing
payment or other consideration to these objectors. Although the
payment may advance class interests in a particular case, allowing
payment perpetuates a system that can encourage objections advanced
for improper purposes. The court-approval requirement currently in
Rule 23(e)(5) partly addresses this concern.138

By requiring court approval for any payment associated with withdrawing
an objection or appeal, the amended rule will help to prevent extortionate
payments and avoid the inappropriate withdrawal of meritorious
objections or appeals. And by simply bringing objection side-deals into
the open, the amended rule may go a long way toward discouraging
professional objectors.139 Preemptively adding similar requirements to
England’s CAT collective action procedure could help to avoid the
professional objector phenomenon altogether.
Among other proposals that have been put forth in the U.S.—and that
may merit consideration in England and Wales—imposing an appeal bond
on non-party objectors to cover the costs of the appeal as well as the costs
of delaying settlement is one option. (Full disclosure: Professor John
Lopatka and I have written an article making that proposal.140) Still other
proposals include adopting an inalienability rule under which objectors are
prohibited from voluntarily settling their appeals,141 inserting “quick-pay”
provisions in class settlement agreements so that class counsel and class
members are not burdened by the cost of delay,142 expediting the appellate
process for non-party objector appeals,143 imposing sanctions on
professional objectors,144 or prohibiting side deals altogether.145 While
each of these options seems to have advantages, each also raises concerns
that have been discussed at length in U.S. class action literature.
The approach that recently took effect is a middle ground that
preserves the ability for both meaningful objection and withdrawal of
objections where appropriate, while also taking steps toward discouraging
the professional objector. It is way too early to judge how far the
amendments will go in resolving the professional objector problem, but it

138. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2018 amendment.
139. See Brunet, supra note 116, at 446.
140. See Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 929.
141. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV.
1623, 1659–66 (2009).
142. See id. at 1640–41.
143. See Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 901–02.
144. See id. at 896.
145. See Bologna, supra note 127 (“The only way to stop this is to prohibit all side
deals – all side deals . . . . If the objectors know they can’t get a side deal, they won’t try
to blackmail class counsel. This way the only people objecting are people who have a real
beef with the settlement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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is difficult to see how the measures cannot at least enhance the integrity of
the class action settlement process.
B.

Collusion Between Class Representatives/Counsel and
Defendants

A second, but complementary, issue in U.S. class actions is the
problem of collusion between class representatives and class counsel and
defendants and their counsel, almost always to the detriment of non-party
class members.146 Because it is the colluding parties who are presenting
the court with the proposed settlement, no one then before the court has
the incentive to raise concerns about the fairness to absent class members
of that settlement.147 This points to why the ability to make meritorious
objections—something I’ve already talked about—is necessary. It is
essential that the named parties have some degree of accountability to the
class members given the representative nature of the proceedings.148 But
objections are not always enough, which has led the U.S. judicial and
legislative branches to take a number of steps aimed at preventing
collusive practices in class action settlements.
One of the important benefits of a well-developed collective action
system is that such a system allows individuals with low-value claims to
have their claims processed in a cost-effective way. But this often means
that individual class members don’t have much “skin in the game.” They
have little to gain and little to lose. As the Third Circuit has explained, this
situation creates “a concern that those actions are brought primarily to
benefit class counsel,”149 who recover fees that eclipse a class member’s
individual award amount by multiple magnitudes.
Where the attorneys are more invested in the outcome of a lawsuit
than are their clients, a perverse incentive arises for the attorneys to settle
146. See Waye, supra note 47, at 112 (“Critics claim that class action settlements in
the United States are often the product of collusion between defendants and class action
attorneys seeking to profit at the expense of class members.”).
147. See Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for
Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 48–49, 50 n.66 (2002) (“[T]he
settling defendant and class attorney . . . obviously have no interest in meaningful
inquiries.”); see also Estelle Hurter, Class Action Settlements: Issues and Importance of
Judicial Oversight, 51 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 97, 99 (2018) (“Because the absent
[class] members are not before court and reliance is placed on the representative to act in
their best interests, a further question for consideration is whether the settlement benefits
all members equally (or at all).”).
148. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729,
780 (2013) (“Because class actions are representative actions, ‘adequacy’ is the glue that
holds a class together and ensures due process for absent class members. The system
breaks down – and potential due process issues arise – if either the class representative or
class counsel is incompetent, suffers from a conflict of interest, fails to assert claims with
sufficient vigor, or suffers from other flaws that will detract from a full presentation of the
merits.”).
149. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 2013).
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the case to their own benefit with little regard for the benefit to the class.
As Second Circuit Judge Friendly once explained, the attorney has “every
incentive to accept a settlement that runs into high six figures or more
regardless of how strong the claims for much larger amounts may be . . . .
[A] juicy bird in the hand is worth more than the vision of a much larger
one in the bush.”150 For example, where a settlement directs that attorney
fees will come out of the class common fund award, the pecuniary interests
of the class and class counsel are directly at odds. In other cases, class
counsel may agree to accept a low settlement offer in exchange for the
defendant’s agreeing not to object to counsel’s fee proposal.151 As one
court has explained it, “lawyers might urge a class settlement at a low
figure or on a less-than-optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet treatment
on fees.”152
One egregious, and much too common, example of this problem
arose in the form of so-called “coupon settlements.” In a coupon
settlement, class members receive no more than a discount in purchasing
a new product from the very defendant vendor or manufacturer who has
been sued and wishes to settle.153 The coupon is in lieu of a direct
monetary payment. Yet while class members have received only a coupon,
class counsel obtain cash payment for their attorney fees—often based on
the total value of the coupons—whether or not class members ever redeem
them. As explained by Congress, “[c]lass members often receive little or
no benefit from class actions, and are sometimes harmed, such as where
. . . counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving class members with
coupons or other awards of little or no value.”154
One example is a 1995 class action in the Third Circuit involving
defects in GM truck fuel tanks.155 Class counsel negotiated a settlement
under which class members received only a coupon for $1,000 that they
could apply to the purchase of a new truck. The total price of a new truck,
to which the coupon would apply, was estimated at between $20,000 and
$33,000, and the coupons expired after 15 months.156 Of course, the
coupons could be used by only those class members who had tens of
thousands of dollars available to pay the balance of the purchase price.157
150. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting).
151. See Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 473–74
(2000).
152. Weinberger v. Great Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991).
153. See Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s
Clothes of Class Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343, 1344 (2005).
154. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 4–5
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, and 1711–15 (2005)).
155. See generally In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
156. See id. at 808.
157. See id.
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Other class members would receive no real value, and the settlement did
nothing to resolve the safety concern with the defective fuel tanks.158
Further, even where class members did successfully use the coupons, that
use was a real benefit to the defendant truck manufacturer because class
members were ultimately returning to that manufacturer and spending tens
of thousands of dollars over the amount of the coupon.159 Despite these
obvious problems with the settlement, the District Court both approved it
and granted class counsel a fee award of $9.5 million—an award our Court
called “unusually large in light of the fact that the settlement itself offered
no cash outlay to the class.”160 On appeal, in an opinion written by my late,
great colleague and friend, Judge Ed Becker, the Third Circuit reversed,
vacating approval of the settlement and remanding for further
proceedings.161
While I’m not aware of coupon settlements or similar abusive
practices taking hold in England and Wales, they are certainly something
to be avoided. GLOs have some built-in protections against collusion
between named plaintiffs and defendants because all class members are
effectively named plaintiffs in GLOs. Represented parties in a
representative action also have some protection in that they can
retroactively opt-out of the class by demonstrating that representation was
inadequate.162 Notably, in the UK Google representative action I
mentioned earlier that was rejected in part based on the “same interest”
test, the Court provided an additional basis for rejecting the representative
format.163 It stated flatly that “[t]he main beneficiaries of any award at the
end of this litigation would be the funders and the lawyers, by a
considerable margin.”164 That’s certainly a positive indication that English
judges will be considering whether an award ultimately benefits the class,
or only the attorneys, when deciding whether to approve a representative
action.
Still, the lack of court involvement in settlement under both the
representative action and GLO collective action regimes does present a
situation where collusion may go uncorrected. Settlement offers in a GLO
need not be judicially approved,165 and courts are generally not required to

158. See id. at 808, 819.
159. See id. at 808.
160. Id. at 810.
161. See id. at 822–23.
162. See Neil H. Andrews, Multi-Party Litigation in England 5 (Univ. of Cambridge
Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 39/2013, 2013), https://bit.ly/2lPRlot (explaining that
represented parties can also “secede from the main group” if they are “discontent with the
manner in which the proceedings are being conducted by the head representative”).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 68–72.
164. Lloyd v. Google LLC [2018] EWHC (QB) 2599 [102] (Eng.).
165. MULHERON, supra note 54, at 102.
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give approval prior to settlement in a representative action.166 With little
or no court oversight of the settlement process, a settlement that primarily
benefits counsel is possible—and it should be guarded against. Under the
CAT collective action regime, judicial approval of a settlement is
required167 and may help to guard against collusion. Such judicial
supervision and approval is the first line of defense against abusive
settlements. Even so, as reflected in the U.S. coupon settlement example,
judicial supervision is no guarantee against collusive settlements. So even
as to the CAT system, it may be helpful for England to reflect on some of
the additional steps we have taken in the U.S. to prevent improper
settlements and address coupon settlements in particular.
As criticism of coupon settlements grew in the U.S., Congress took
concrete action. In the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”),168
Congress heightened the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied to coupon
settlements and limited attorney fees that could be awarded for such
settlements, attacking the source of the collusive settlement problem. First,
as to judicial scrutiny, Congress specified that for a “proposed settlement
under which class members would be awarded coupons, the court may
approve the settlement only after a hearing to determine whether, and
making a written finding that, the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate for class members.”169 Second, Congress required that, where
there is a coupon settlement, attorney fees based on the award of coupons
“shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are
redeemed.”170 Gone are the days when attorney fees were untethered from
any benefit class members derived from effectively unredeemable
coupons. As one pre-CAFA report indicated, “[t]he single most important
action that judges can take to support the public goals of class action
litigation is to reward class action attorneys only for lawsuits that actually
accomplish something of value to class members and society.”171 The
CAFA, then, was a substantial step toward aligning the interests of class
counsel and class members, at least as to coupon settlements.
As I’ve explained, the objector system in the U.S. also provides an
avenue for addressing the collusion problem because absent class
members can oppose an unjust settlement proposal and assert their

166. Andrews, supra note 162, at 4 (“[T]he court does not approve settlements of
representative proceedings, unless the represented persons are either under a mental
disability or are minors.”).
167. Competition Act 1998, c. 4, §§ 49A–B (UK).
168. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, and 1711-15 (2005)).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
170. Id. § 1712(a).
171. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 33 (1999), https://bit.ly/35NIw0u.
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interests.172 But the major limitation of the objector system is that often
absent class members simply do not have the financial incentive to
challenge a proposed settlement. Some commentators have suggested that
what the U.S. class action system needs to protect absent class members
from collusion is an appointed guardian ad litem for absent class
members173 or a “‘devil’s advocate’ to oppose class action settlements.”174
In some instances, public interest groups have taken up the mantel of
intervening in class actions and objecting to unfair settlement proposals.175
The CAFA also sought to address the problem of class member
apathy with an additional requirement that a defendant give notice of any
settlement proposal to the Attorney General of the United States and to
appropriate state officials.176 The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or
relevant state entities have the ability to intervene and object to the
settlement.177 Whether they have the political will to do so is another
matter. Unfortunately, the DOJ made little use of this tool early on, filing
only two objections soon after enactment of CAFA, and then did not file
a single objection for ten years.178 But in 2018, an associate attorney
172. See Hurter, supra note 147, at 107 (“With the ‘adversarial void’ created by the
unified front presented by the parties after settlement, when decadently one-sided
arguments are presented in support of the settlement, the only other assistance may come
from objections by class members, if any.”).
173. See Brunet, supra note 116, at 410 (“A second potential monitor of the behavior
of class action attorneys is a court-appointed guardian ad litem for objectors and potential
objectors to a proposed settlement.”); Issacharoff & Klonoff, supra note 77, at 1188
(“[C]ourts can appoint special masters, court experts, or other adjuncts to help with the
settlement process and provide an additional layer of protection for the class.”); see also In
re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that a law professor was
appointed as guardian ad litem to review the fairness of settlement to the class), vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Flanagan v. Ahearn, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), remanded to 134 F.3d
668 (5th Cir. 1998).
174. Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97,
140, 155 n.274 (2014) (citing John Leubsdorf, Statement at the Public Hearing on Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Nov. 22, 1996), in 4 WORKING
PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
CIVIL RULE 23, at 9 (1997), available at https://bit.ly/2MnDxf8 (proposing that Rule 23 be
amended to “require courts to appoint a lawyer to challenge any proposed settlement in
any class action in which the estimated value of the relief (including attorney fees) exceeds
$1,000,000”)).
175. See Brunet, supra note 116, at 409 (“At present, several public interest groups
routinely seek intervention to participate in critiquing allegedly unfair proposed class
actions settlements. Both Public Citizen and the Trial Lawyers for Public Justice Class
Action Abuse Prevention Project have repeatedly represented objectors to proposed class
action settlements.”); see also Klonoff, supra note 23, at 1630 (“[A]ggressive objections
by public interest organizations have brought to light some serious ethical abuses.”).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
177. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 32–33 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), available at
https://bit.ly/2ZmRW0w; see also 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2018).
178. See Rachel L. Brand, Assoc. Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks to the
Washington, D.C. Lawyers Chapter of the Federalist Society (Feb. 15, 2018), available at
https://bit.ly/2m792jk.
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general announced that the DOJ had modified its screening procedure,
which would result in objections being filed to unfair settlements.179 And,
in fact, the DOJ promptly filed three objections by mid-2018.180
In Cannon v. Ashburn Corp., the DOJ objected to a proposed
settlement because it paid too much to class counsel and included only
“limited value” coupons for class members.181 In Cowen v. Lenny &
Larry’s, the DOJ objected because most of the settlement value was only
in the form of free cookies (Lenny & Larry’s product at issue in the case),
and class counsel would receive fees disproportionate to that value.182
(One can only hope they were darn good cookies). And in Chapman v.
Tristar Products, the DOJ objected because named plaintiffs and class
counsel were to receive benefits disproportionate to the value of the
settlement to absent class members.183 These objections demonstrate the
power of the CAFA notice provisions, when invoked, to correct and guard
against collusive settlement practices.
In 2018, the federal judiciary’s Civil Rules Committee also amended
Rule 23 to add stronger language to the section providing for judicial
approval of settlements. As I’ve noted, this first line of defense—judicial
supervision—may be the best guarantee of a fair settlement. Like CAFA’s
restriction on coupon settlements, Rule 23 states that, where a settlement
proposal would bind class members, a court may approve a settlement
proposal only “after a hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable,
and adequate.”184 In 2018, the Rules Committee added four specific
questions that a court must consider before approving a proposed
settlement: “whether: (A) the class representatives and class counsel have
adequately represented the class; (B) [whether] the proposal was
negotiated at arm’s length; (C) [whether] the relief provided for the class
is adequate, . . . and (D) [whether] the proposal treats class members
equitably relative to each other.”185 These considerations go directly to
addressing the collusive practices I’ve discussed by requiring courts to
179. See id.
180. See Statement of Interest of the United States, Cannon v. Ashburn Corp., No.
16-1452 (RMB/AMD), 2018 WL 1406882, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2018), ECF No. 58
[hereinafter Cannon Statement]; Statement of Interest of the United States, Cowen v.
Lenny & Larry’s, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-01530, 2018 WL 7456041, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15,
2019), ECF No. 103 [hereinafter Cowen Statement]; Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Appellant and Urging Reversal, Chapman v. Tristar Prods., Inc., Nos.
18-3847, 18-3866, 2019 WL 495842, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 4, 2019), ECF No. 5 (appeal from
Northern District of Ohio decision No. 1:16-cv-01114); see also Department of Justice
Increasingly
Challenges
Class
Settlements,
JONES DAY (Mar. 2019),
https://bit.ly/2kgGiUZ.
181. See Cannon Statement, supra note 180, at 1.
182. See Cowen Statement, supra note 180, at 1.
183. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant and
Urging Reversal, supra note 180, at 1.
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
185. Id.
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ensure that any settlement actually benefits the class and that it is based on
appropriate representation by class counsel. As the Rules Committee
explained, “[t]he central concern in reviewing a proposed class-action
settlement is that it be fair, reasonable, and adequate,” and the inquiries
added to the Rule will “focus the court and the lawyers on the core
concerns of procedure and substance that should guide the decision
whether to approve the proposal.”186
One District Court has recently extended Rule 23’s description of a
judge’s duty to the class in a dramatic fashion—and perhaps beyond what
the Rule contemplates.187 The Judge concluded that his fiduciary
obligations permit him to enjoin settlement negotiations altogether until
after a ruling has been made on whether to certify the class. He explained
that “[t]o avoid . . . prejudice to absent class members, it is better to clear
away any doubts about certification, so that if certification is granted,
plaintiff’s counsel can negotiate from strength.”188 According to the Judge,
this procedure is necessary in part because, once there is a settlement
agreement, counsel “will align to support the deal,” and “[n]either counsel
will surface any problems that might have plagued a certification
motion.”189 As noted by the court, “[w]hen it comes to class action
settlements, the usual criticism of trial judges is that they have done too
little – not too much – in protecting class members.”190 The defendant in
that action is currently challenging the District Court’s order in the Ninth
Circuit. Right or wrong, the District Court’s action was unquestionably
motivated by exactly the concerns I’ve been discussing—the potential for
a collusive settlement to the detriment of absent class members. And while
it remains to be determined whether the District Court’s chosen course of
enjoining settlement negotiations was permissible, in the abstract, close
oversight and affirmative efforts to protect absent class members is what
the rules encourage.191
So by way of legislative action, amendment to Rule 23, and strong
judicial oversight, Congress and the federal courts have taken steps toward
elimination of the collusion problem. Although such abusive practices
may not yet be the problem in England and Wales that they have been in
186. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2018 amendment.
187. See Notice and Order Re Putative Class Actions, Porath v. Logitech, Inc., No.
3:18-CV-03091 WHA, 2019 WL 266258 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019), ECF No. 16.
188. Statement of District Court Judge William Alsup in Response to Mandamus
Petition at 3, In re Logitech, Inc., No. 19-70248, 2019 WL 4319012 (9th Cir. Feb. 28,
2019), ECF No. 4.
189. Id. at 4–5.
190. Id. at 10.
191. Authors Note: Six weeks after this lecture, the Ninth Circuit issued its ruling,
suggesting that the Judge should have made “specific findings of the abuses” he “was
concerned about,” or “consider[ed] narrower means of protecting the parties,” but finding
no clear error justifying mandamus. See In re Logitech, Inc., No. 19-70248, 2019 WL
4319012, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2019).
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the U.S. system, UK practitioners and law-makers are well-advised to take
precautionary steps to strengthen judicial scrutiny of settlements and
eliminate what could be a strong incentive for counsel to act against the
interests of class members and other represented parties.
C.

Cy Pres

The third concept, which ties directly into our discussion of collusive
settlements, is the practice of cy pres distributions. The doctrine of cy pres
has increasingly been applied in U.S. class actions,192 and has its origins
in English law.193 In fact, the first modern cy pres cases arose in
seventeenth century English chancery courts in the context of charitable
trusts.194
The common belief is that the term “cy pres” is derived from the
Norman French expression cy pres comme possible, which means “as near
as possible,”195 and that is precisely what the doctrine attempts to do—
require that a distribution of money or property be made in a way that is
“as near as possible” to an intended distribution, where that original
intended distribution cannot be realized. Although the term cy pres has
been used to mean many things, I use the term here to describe the payment
of class action damages to third party organizations, as an indirect means
of benefitting class members, where distribution to the class members
themselves is deemed impractical or impossible.
It is important to begin by noting that application of cy pres is not in
itself improper or even problematic. Cy pres can be a useful tool where
courts are unable to distribute a class award directly to class members.
Where problems arise is when the cy pres doctrine is pushed to extremes,
as it has been sometimes in recent U.S. jurisprudence.
As a starting point, there are many reasons why proceeds of a class
action award may not viably be distributed directly to class members. The
most common application of cy pres distribution awards occurs when a
common fund has been created to pay damages to class members, and,
after class members have made claims on the fund, money is left over.196
This may happen where the parties have settled and overestimated the
number of class members, or where class members don’t consider the size
of their individual awards to be worth the effort of going through the
claims process.197 With residual funds remaining, the court administering
the common fund must figure out what to do with them. Options include
reversion of the unclaimed funds to the defendant, escheat to the state,
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See Wasserman, supra note 174, at 100.
See RACHAEL P. MULHERON, THE MODERN CY-PRES DOCTRINE 6 (2006).
See id.
In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 168 (3d Cir. 2013).
See Wasserman, supra note 174, at 100.
See id. at 103–05.
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distributing the funds on a pro rata basis to the class members who have
already submitted claims, or distributing the fund cy pres to a third party
organization.198 Cy pres is an attractive option under these circumstances
because it advances the class action goals of disgorgement and deterrence,
and is designed to compensate class members, albeit indirectly.199
In some cases, cy pres has been used as the sole method of
distributing damages.200 Full cy pres is becoming a common practice
where distribution of damages to class members is impractical because the
per-class-member award is so small that it does not justify the
administrative costs of delivering the award to each class member. In one
recent case, the award per class member was three cents.201 Of course, a
U.S. postage stamp currently costs 55 cents. So the theory is that cy pres
can be used to permit “aggregate calculation of damages” and the
distribution of funds to “indirectly benefit the entire class,” where
distribution directly to class members is too costly.202
The real problem with cy pres arises where the doctrine, “intended as
a ‘salvage’ tool,”203 is the motivating reason for initiating the class action,
rather than a tool of last resort. And there are indications that the U.S. class
action system is over-using—even abusing—cy pres. One study reports
that, from the advent of the use of cy pres awards in class actions in 1974
through 2000, courts approved cy pres awards in only 30 cases.204 Then
from 2001 through 2010, cy pres awards were approved in sixty-five class
actions.205 Of these sixty-five cases, the majority occurred in class actions
that were certified only for the purpose of settlement.206 In ten of the sixtyfive cases, the cy pres award was over 75% of the total settlement, and the
authors of the study concluded that all ten of those cases were “potentially

198. See Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres and the Optimal Class Action, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 767, 768–69 (2014); see also Wasserman, supra note 174, at 106–14.
199. See In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[C]y
pres distributions have benefits over the alternative choices. Reversion to the defendant
risks undermining the deterrent effect of class actions by rewarding defendants for the
failure of class members to collect their share of the settlement. Escheat to the state
preserves the deterrent effect of class actions, but it benefits the community at large rather
than those harmed by the defendant’s conduct. Cy pres distributions also preserve the
deterrent effect, but (at least theoretically) more closely tailor the distribution to the
interests of class members, including those absent members who have not received
individual distributions.”).
200. See, e.g., Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1047–48 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
201. Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011).
202. Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir.
1990).
203. MULHERON, supra note 193, at 310.
204. See Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern
Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 653 (2010).
205. See id.
206. See id. at 661.
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questionable cases” on the merits.207 As discussed earlier, there can be no
doubt that settlement-only classes, and particularly full cy pres settlementonly classes, can “be used by parties to conceal problematic types of class
actions.”208 That is to say, “where the class action procedure is used
primarily for the benefit of participants in the process other than the absent
claimants.”209 It is, of course, easier to distribute funds to single, or a
handful of, organizations than it is to administer the distribution of funds
to thousands or even millions of class members. In either case, class
counsel typically collect the same fee.210
Given the perverse incentives that sometimes exist for class counsel
in these cases, it is particularly important that any class award be for the
benefit of class members. As the Third Circuit has explained: “Cy pres
distributions, while in our view permissible, are inferior to direct
distributions to the class because they only imperfectly serve the purpose
of the underlying causes of action – to compensate class members.”211
Supreme Court Justice Thomas has taken this view a step further,
suggesting that cy pres settlements are, in themselves, evidence of a
conflict of interest between class counsel and class members: “[T]he fact
that class counsel and the named plaintiffs were willing to settle the class
claims without obtaining any relief for the class – while securing
significant benefits for themselves – strongly suggests that the interests of
the class were not adequately represented.”212
Regardless of whether cy pres awards should ultimately be
permissible in some cases, it is clear that, too often, the interests of class
members have been pushed to the side by cy pres awards that inure
primarily to the benefit of class counsel and defendants.213 Such awards
create an indirect benefit to class members that is “at best attenuated and
at worse illusory.”214
For example, in a class settlement related to the systematic
overpricing of baby-related products, the defendant retailers paid $35.5

207. Id.
208. Id. at 653.
209. Id. at 654.
210. See Hurter, supra note 147, at 102–03 (noting the argument that “cy-pres awards
and injunctive relief serve[] primarily to inflate attorneys’ fee awards while providing little
or no benefit to the class members”).
211. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2013).
212. Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1047 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
213. See Jennifer Johnston, Cy Pres Comme Possible to Anything Is Possible: How
Cy Pres Creates Improper Incentives in Class Action Settlements, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
277, 278–79 (2013) (“Courts that approve such vaguely related distributions do a great
disservice to the absent class members, while at the same time furthering the interests of
the plaintiffs’ attorneys, judges, the third party who receives the distribution, and – at times
– even the defendants.”).
214. See In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d at 173.
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million into a settlement fund.215 Of that amount, $14 million was slated
to go to class counsel.216 And because of difficulties in proving a claim
(class members were required to submit a receipt), only $3 million of the
settlement fund—8.5% of the total fund—was expected to go to class
members.217 That’s only one-fifth as much as what was to be paid to class
counsel. $18.5 million was left for cy pres distribution.218 The Third
Circuit rejected this settlement and remanded with instructions for the
District Court to consider “whether this or any alternative settlement
provides sufficient direct benefit to the class” before approving the
settlement.219
Even more egregious are recent full cy pres cases where class
members received no benefit at all. In a settlement regarding privacy
violations by Facebook, Facebook agreed to discontinue an invasive
program and pay $9.5 million.220 But Facebook was free to restart the same
program under a new name—and none of the $9.5 million went directly to
class members.221 Instead, nearly one-quarter of the fund went directly to
class counsel, and the $6.5 million remaining was used to create a
charitable foundation to educate the public about online privacy—with the
condition that a Facebook representative would be one of three members
of the foundation’s board.222 The rationale behind this use of the fund was
that the award per class member would be too small to justify
distribution.223 But the realities are plain: class counsel earned a handsome
sum from the litigation, and Facebook earned the goodwill that goes with
participation in a charitable organization, all the while obtaining the
release of millions of class members’ claims. As U.S. Chief Justice
Roberts has explained, there are “fundamental concerns surrounding the
use of such remedies in class action litigation.”224
Another example of cy pres gone wrong occurred in Frank v. Gaos,
a recent case involving a class action settlement with Google, again based
on privacy violations. In that case, Google agreed to include disclosures
related to the alleged privacy violation and to pay $8.5 million into a
settlement fund.225 Under the agreement, however, Google could continue
with the practice challenged in the lawsuit, and none of the money in the

215. Id. at 169.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 169–70.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 170.
220. Marek v. Lane, 571 U.S. 1003, 1004–05 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., respecting the
denial of certiorari).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1005.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1006.
225. Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1045 (2019).
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settlement fund would be distributed to class members.226 Instead, over $5
million was to go to cy pres recipients, and more than $2 million would go
to class counsel.227 Again, the parties and the District Judge approving the
settlement justified this procedure on the basis that the per-class-member
distribution of four cents would be too small to warrant the expense of
mailing checks. As such, class members themselves were to receive no
direct benefit from the settlement, leaving them to rely on a potential
indirect benefit via cy pres distribution.
The cy pres recipients in Frank v. Gaos were selected by class
counsel and Google, purportedly to “promote public awareness and
education, and/or to support research, development, and initiatives, related
to protecting privacy on the Internet.”228 These are laudable goals, yet the
organizations actually selected bore little relation to the subject of the class
action. Specifically, the six organizations selected to receive the over $5
million in settlement funds were the AARP, four universities, and the
World Privacy Forum.229 Only the last-named organization has a purpose
specifically related to privacy interests. Inclusion of the AARP was
especially troubling because it is a powerful interest group in the United
States and conducts political activity in many fields wholly unrelated to
privacy and technology. On review by the U.S. Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Roberts echoed that concern, even asking during oral argument:
“[D]o you think that problem is going to be meaningfully redressed by
giving money to AARP? . . . . [A]s if this is only a problem for elderly
people?”230
I should also mention that where cy pres donations to charitable
organizations are part of the settlement agreement, defendants often
receive not only the goodwill accompanying those donations, but also tax
breaks under the U.S. tax code.231 Sometimes, the only people involved in
the case who fail to benefit from a cy pres distribution are the absent class
members themselves—the ones whose very claims are being settled.
While these abuses may not be familiar to the English judicial system,
cy pres itself is. Indeed, in the 1801 English case Brudenell v. Elwes, Lord
Chief Justice Kenyon gave a warning that both U.S. and English courts

226. Id.
227. Id. at 1043.
228. Id. at 1045.
229. See In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir.
2017), vacated and remanded sub nom. Frank, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019).
230. Transcript of Oral Argument, Frank, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019) (No. 17-961), 2018
WL 5722840, at *42.
231. See Wasserman, supra note 174, at 120 (“Typically, when a defendant makes a
donation to charity in lieu of direct payments to class members, the defendant enjoys the
good will and good publicity (and possibly even the tax deduction) associated with making
a charitable gift . . . .”).
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would be well advised to heed: “The doctrine of cy pres goes to the utmost
verge of the law . . . ; and we must take care that it does not run wild.”232
Recently, here in England, cy pres has been used in the consumer
regulatory context. For example, in a highly publicized case in the early
1990s, Rover Car Company paid one million pounds for car research to
the Consumers’ Association to compensate for breach of competition
laws.233 Under the new CAT collective action system, unclaimed funds
from a judgment must be paid to the aptly named Access to Justice
Foundation, and unclaimed funds from a settlement are subject to normal
cy pres distribution or reversion, depending on the circumstances.234
The CAT procedure of distributing funds to the Access to Justice
Foundation will avoid the difficulty the U.S. system has faced in deciding
who should be a recipient of the funds. But it is also likely to present issues
similar to those raised in the U.S. system as to what the purpose of the
collective action is and whether distributing a significant portion of funds
to the Foundation, instead of to class members, adequately accomplishes
that purpose.
The cy pres distribution stemming from future settlements under the
CAT procedure will likely present many of the concerns attendant to U.S.
cy pres distributions. Bear in mind that class actions under the CAT system
can be brought by ideological plaintiffs who have no claims of their own.
That means that no injured individual is necessarily involved in the
litigation at all. Given the potential for conflicts of interest to arise between
an ideological plaintiff and the class, ensuring that cy pres distributions
are appropriate and fair should be a priority for English courts. English
judges may be able to avoid some of the pitfalls we’ve encountered in the
U.S. through the consideration of alternatives to cy pres, along with careful
oversight throughout the course of the litigation.
The U.S. class action system has yet to fully come to grips with the
misuse of cy pres. Various alternatives have been proposed, though, and
through the litigation process courts continue to weigh the appropriateness
of cy pres awards. Critics of cy pres awards in class actions often propose
three alternative approaches to address the problems inherent in such
awards. First, there is the direct payment approach, under which an award
is given to some class members on a pro rata or random basis rather than
being distributed cy pres to charities. Another proposed approach is similar
to the CAFA treatment of coupon settlements under which attorney fees
for cy pres awards must be tied to the benefit actually received by the class.
Finally, some critics, including Justice Thomas, suggest an approach under
232. Brudenell v. Elwes (1801) 102 Eng. Rep. 171, 174; 1 East 442.
233. See Geraint Howells & Rhoda James, Litigation in the Consumer Interest, 9
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 40 (2002) (citing David Nicholson-Lord, Rover ‘Pays’ 1m
Pounds Compensation, INDEP. (Nov. 17, 1993, 1:02 AM), http://bit.ly/2ksdI2U).
234. See Mulheron, supra note 96, at 816–17.
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which the need for a cy pres award is considered at the class certification
stage. If the presiding judge found no direct benefit to class members, the
class would simply not be certified. Other creative approaches to ensure
that cy pres awards actually benefit the class, such as allowing class
members to vote for a cy pres recipient, have been proposed, but they’ve
not advanced beyond mere academic discussion.235 I’ll discuss the three
primary cy pres alternatives in turn.
First, the direct payment approach comes in at least two forms. In
one, where funds remain even after class members have been
compensated, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) has proposed that,
rather than distributing to charities unclaimed or residual portions of a
class award, the award be distributed to the already compensated class
members on a pro rata basis. Specifically, the ALI approach suggests that,
where funds remain after distribution to class members “the settlement
should presumptively provide for further distributions to participating
class members,” and only where the amount is too small to make further
distribution “economically viable” should cy pres distribution be
considered.236 Although this approach has not been formally adopted by
Congress or the Civil Rules Committee, it is a logical extension of existing
concepts regarding compensation to the class. For example, in one
instance the Third Circuit remanded a judgment providing for a large cy
pres award, suggesting that the District Court consider “provid[ing]
greater direct benefit to the class” by increasing the pro rata award or
“lowering the evidentiary bar for receiving a higher award” rather than
distributing the significant residual funds cy pres.237
A very different direct payment approach is called for when a class
award is insufficient to compensate all class members. Some academics
have proposed a lottery or sampling approach under which the fund is used
to compensate some class members at random, rather than distributing all
funds cy pres and not compensating any class members directly.238
Both direct payment approaches have the advantage of actually being
used to compensate the injured class members and eliminating the
arbitrariness that can arise in cy pres awards.239 Clearly, the primary

235. See, e.g., Chris J. Chasin, Modernizing Class Action Cy Pres Through
Democratic Inputs: A Return to Cy Pres Comme Possible, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1464–
65 (2015).
236. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
237. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 175 (3d Cir. 2013).
238. See, e.g., Shay Lavie, Reverse Sampling: Holding Lotteries to Allocate the
Proceeds of Small-Claims Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1100 (2011).
239. See id. (“Where the cy pres doctrine fails to remunerate class members and
creates unfettered judicial discretion, the reverse sampling method mandates courts to
transfer the proceeds to the victims. Where the cy pres doctrine wastes judicial time and
encourages charities to compete for windfalls, reverse sampling avoids beneficiaries’
perverse incentives.”).

340

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 124:2

purpose of a class award is to compensate members of the class, so direct
payment approaches are superior to cy pres awards. In 2015, the Civil
Rules Committee considered an amendment that would have adopted an
approach similar to the one put forth by the ALI.240 Yet for better or worse,
the Committee ultimately concluded that such an amendment “would not
be likely to improve the handling of [cy pres] issues” and that such issues
could be adequately addressed through the existing settlement process.241
The second approach to remedy the cy pres problem is to treat fee
awards for cy pres payments in the same way that coupon settlements are
treated under CAFA: tying attorney fees to the benefit actually conferred
on class members.242 As Justice Thomas has explained, “cy pres payments
are not a form of relief to the absent class members and should not be
treated as such (including when calculating attorney’s fees).”243 The ALI
has recommended a similar, but slightly more lenient approach, suggesting
that attorney fees can be based on the value of cy pres awards, but that
because such awards “only indirectly benefit the class, the court need not
give such payments the same full value for purposes of setting attorneys’
fees as would be given to direct recoveries by the class.”244 In 2017, a bill
to do just that was introduced in the House of Representatives.245 The bill
prescribed that, where a class action resulted in a monetary award, attorney
fees would be “limited to a reasonable percentage of any payments directly
distributed to and received by class members” and “[i]n no event” were
attorney fees to “exceed the total amount of money directly distributed to

240. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, CIVIL AGENDA BOOK 201 (2015),
available at https://bit.ly/2mb9mxK (“If the proposal involves individual distributions to
class members and funds remain after initial distributions, the proposal must provide for
further distributions to participating class members . . . unless individual distributions
would not be economically viable or other specific reasons exist that would make such
further distributions impossible or unfair.”).
241. Id. at 90.
242. See, e.g., Tidmarsh, supra note 198, at 788–89 (“[I]n calculating the amount of
the recovery on which the [fee] percentage is calculated, a court must include only the
amount distributed to class members. . . . [This modification] eliminate[s] the incentive for
class counsel to press for cy pres relief; the reason is that these distributions, as well as the
time counsel spent obtaining or administering them, would not be compensable elements
of class counsel’s fee.”); Wasserman, supra note 174, at 137 (“I propose that courts alter
the method they use to calculate attorneys’ fees. In particular, borrowing from the solution
Congress adopted in the Class Action Fairness Act to address the problem of coupon
settlements, I propose that courts presumptively reduce attorneys’ fees whenever all or a
portion of the class action settlement is distributed to charities cy pres.” (internal footnotes
omitted)).
243. Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1047–48 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
244. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.13 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
2010).
245. See Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim
Transparency Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017).
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and received by all class members.”246 The bill passed in the House, but
died in the Senate Judiciary Committee.247
Still, although this reduced-fee approach has not been codified, some
courts have applied it in certain instances.248 The Third Circuit has
explained that “[c]lass members are not indifferent to whether funds are
distributed to them or to cy pres recipients, and class counsel should not
be either.”249 So “[w]here a district court has reason to believe that counsel
has not met its responsibility to seek an award that adequately prioritizes
direct benefit to the class, . . . it [is] appropriate for the court to decrease
the fee award.”250 As in the coupon settlement context, such a change
would help to “better align the interests of class counsel and the class.”251
Finally, the third approach to address inappropriate cy pres awards
would be to deny class treatment where it is impossible to actually
compensate class members. If the purpose of a class action is to obtain
relief on a class-wide basis, then arguably class treatment is not
appropriate where there is no direct relief for the class. Indeed, in such
cases relief in the form of a declaratory judgment or regulatory action may
be “superior” both in terms of obtaining relief for the class and judicial
economy. Because under Rule 23(b)(3) a class may be certified only where
the class action device is “superior to other available methods for fairly
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,”252 a class should not be
certified where other procedural devices would be at least as effective. As
Justice Thomas has explained, a class action may not be superior to other
procedural devices “when it serves only as a vehicle through which to
extinguish the absent class members’ claims without providing them any
relief.”253
Here is a gross example, in a case from the District of New Jersey,
where the parties prepared a proposed settlement resulting in a full cy pres
award, in part because the class members did not want to participate in the
class action.254 The Court concluded that the settlement was “a thinly
disguised ploy for the recovery of nearly $500,000 in attorneys’ fees” and

246. See H.R. 985 § 103 (as passed by House, Mar. 9, 2017).
247. See H.R. 985 - Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos
Claim Transparency Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://bit.ly/2lZp3rx (last visited Sept.
22, 2019).
248. See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2013)
(“[W]e confirm that courts need to consider the level of direct benefit provided to the class
in calculating attorneys’ fees.”).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Wasserman, supra note 174, at 137.
252. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
253. Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1047 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
254. See In re Matzo Food Prods. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 600, 606 (D.N.J. 1994).

342

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 124:2

that, because the class members did not want to pursue their claims, “the
[settlement] fund never should have been created in the first place.”255
Any of these approaches, or a combination of them, could help to
resolve the cy pres problem in U.S. class action litigation, and a definitive
ruling on cy pres awards seems imminent. Indeed, the Frank v. Gaos case
I mentioned was before the U.S. Supreme Court this past term. Some
anticipated that the Court would address the viability of full cy pres
awards. The question before the Court was “[w]hether, or in what
circumstances, a cy pres award of class action proceeds that provides no
direct relief to class members supports class certification and comports
with the requirement that a settlement binding class members must be
‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’”256 Unfortunately, the Court did not
answer that question, instead remanding the case on standing grounds.
We’ll continue to wait for the next major development in U.S. class action
cy pres awards. Regardless, England and Wales may benefit from
considering these questions preemptively, before the possibility of large
cy pres awards under the CAT system is realized.
D.

Harassing Claims/Strike Suits

I’ve been discussing ways in which the class device is abused and
how the interests of class members are sometimes subordinated to the
interests of others. But there is another abusive practice in the U.S. class
action system, and it harms certain targeted defendants: the filing of socalled “strike suits.” This occurs when plaintiffs file meritless putative
class actions simply for their settlement value, because they know
defendants will find it is more expensive to defend the meritless action
than to pay a settlement.257
Class actions are themselves big business in the U.S. They’re not a
“cottage industry.” In a recent survey of 400 U.S. companies, the
companies reported spending a combined $2.46 billion in 2018 just
defending class actions.258 The expected cost for the same companies to
defend against class actions in 2019 is even higher: $2.56 billion.259 When
so much money is being shelled out just for defense costs alone—not
judgment or settlement costs—it leaves significant room for settlement
negotiations.

255. Id.
256. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Frank, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (Jan. 3, 2018) (No. 17961), 2018 WL 347810, at *1.
257. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 523
(1997).
258. CARLTON FIELDS, 2019 CLASS ACTION SURVEY 6–7 (2019),
https://classactionsurvey.com.
259. See id.
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Just as there are professional objectors, there are professional class
action filers—both attorneys and named plaintiffs who repeatedly file
class actions, often without adequate legal basis, and almost always for the
sole purpose of extracting a settlement. In the United States, there are no
major obstacles to filing a claim, including a putative class action. A
plaintiff need only file a complaint and pay a filing fee. And if a plaintiff
does not intend to actually litigate the claim, plaintiff and counsel don’t
have to spend a lot of money conducting discovery and preparing a case.
The complaint needs only to meet the minimal standard of plainly stating
a legal claim. But, for a defendant, defending against even a meritless
claim may mean significant expense—and perhaps even negative
publicity.260
And, unlike in the UK, the American Rule for fees does not
presumptively allow fee-shifting if a plaintiff’s claim fails. Instead,
defendants must bear their own costs even when defending against a weak
claim, unless a defendant can establish that the plaintiff acted in bad
faith—a high bar that is rarely met where a claim had any arguable merit
at the time of filing. Defendants therefore have a strong interest in avoiding
or minimizing defense costs—even if they are confident of ultimately
prevailing—because they will be on the hook for those costs no matter
what.261 As one academic has explained it, “[w]hen you win, you lose
under our system, I win, I defeat your claim . . . but it has cost me tens,
hundreds of thousands, sometimes millions of dollars. I have a victory that
has brought me to the poorhouse.”262 Well, it may not always be that bad—
but it is true that some attorneys and plaintiffs can make a decent living
simply by filing arguably meritless putative class claims “with little hope
of success on the merits and merely to extract a settlement from
defendants.”263 As explained by Congress when it was addressing strike
suits in the securities context, “[w]hether a shareholder lawsuit is
meritorious or not, the corporation sued must spend a great deal of money
to defend itself. It is common for a corporation simply to agree to a
substantial settlement out of court.”264
Further, given the sometimes astronomical awards in successful class
action cases, risk-averse defendants may be inclined to settle even when
there is only a “tiny probability of an enormous judgment,” rather than
260. See Hurter, supra note 147, at 100.
261. See Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 873.
262. See MARIE GRYPHON, GREATER JUSTICE, LOWER COST: HOW A “LOSER PAYS”
RULE WOULD IMPROVE THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (2008) (quoting Professor Jon
Langbein, The Trouble with Lawyers (ABC television broadcast Jan. 2, 1996)), available
at https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cjr_11.pdf.
263. Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 873.
264. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-50, pt. 1, at 15 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), available at
http://bit.ly/2muDGna; see also GRYPHON, supra note 262, at 6 (“[S]ettlement of nuisance
suits is the norm under the American rule.”).
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engaging in bet-the-company litigation.265 Unlike a typical A v. B lawsuit,
where a defendant is inclined to take a chance on going to trial because it
perceives its likelihood of success as substantial, a defendant in a class
action faces a unique risk of being held liable to a class of at least dozens—
and perhaps tens of thousands—of members.266 Thus, even where a
defendant believes it is likely to win on the merits, it may conclude that
the risk is simply too great. As one court has explained, defendants
effectively face two alternatives: “to stake their companies on the outcome
of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle
even if they have no legal liability.”267
These circumstances have resulted in a cadre of class action filers
who repeatedly file meritless claims. In the same 2018 survey of 400 U.S.
companies cited earlier, the companies reported that 39% of class claims
are settled between the defendant and the named plaintiff in his individual
capacity.268 Stated differently, the putative class claims are settled as
standard A v. B claims, paying no heed to the interests of absent class
members. In these types of individual settlements, absent class members
are not bound, but of course they have received no benefit. While there
may be legitimate cases in which it makes sense for a putative class
representative to settle his individual claim, this individual settlement
figure might be considered a loose proxy for the number of nonmeritorious putative class claims filed. Presumably, a class representative
would not settle on an individual basis if there was a decent likelihood of
a class-wide settlement or judgment.
Similarly, a study of securities class actions indicates that from 1997
to 2017, 50% of claims were settled, 43% were dismissed, and less than
1% went to trial.269 This may suggest, by inference admittedly short of
empirical certainty, that the majority of putative securities class actions are
not meritorious. In the early 1990s, one plaintiffs’ firm filed 229 putative
securities class actions over 44 months. The lead attorney was quoted as
saying “I have the greatest practice of law in the world. I have no

265. Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 873.
266. See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements
in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1391–92 (2000)
(“By threatening the defendant with a classwide trial on the common issues, so goes the
argument, plaintiffs may be able to extract a substantial settlement even for weak claims. . .
. Thus, this argument concludes, class action treatment exposes the defendant to a form of
extortion not present in the separate-action context.” (footnote omitted)).
267. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
268. See CARLTON FIELDS, supra note 258, at 35.
269. STANFORD LAW SCH., SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS – 2018 YEAR IN
REVIEW 16 (2019), https://stanford.io/2mf2yit [hereinafter Clearinghouse 2018 Year in
Review].
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clients.”270 That’s only an anecdote, but it does highlight an abuse that is
not reflective of the goal of class actions. As an aside, that attorney and his
partner later went to prison for bribing individuals to serve as clients.271
Regardless, then, of the exact proportion of U.S. putative class actions that
are filed simply for their settlement value, there can be no dispute that the
practice exists, and that it reflects badly on the U.S. class action system.
When it comes to strike suits, the English collective action model
may have the upper-hand. The ratification procedure for GLOs and the
demanding approval process for CAT collective actions have, as I’ve said,
resulted in there being only 105 GLOs over the past 18 years, and no CAT
collective actions at all. These early approval processes, and their strict
application, likely deter the filing of weak class claims solely to extract
some kind of settlement. The express consideration of the preliminary
merits of the case as part of the CAT collective action approval process
may well be an effective bar on meritless claims. Perhaps even more
importantly, the English Rule for fee-shifting protects English defendants
against the enormous costs that are often born by U.S. litigants. Where an
English defendant successfully defends against an action, whether a
collective action or otherwise, the plaintiff, if he loses, presumptively
bears the defense costs.272 As a result, defendants are not under pressure
to settle simply to avoid attorney fees and costs.
Still, the United States has taken some steps to prevent strike suits,
and those measures might be relevant to the evolving English experience
with aggregate litigation. For example, in the field of securities litigation,
Congress recognized the problem of unfounded securities fraud class
actions, and in 1995 passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”).273 Indeed, the purpose of Title I of the Act is clearly identified
in its heading, “Reduction of Abusive Litigation.”274 Among other things,
the Act required averments of good faith filings by the representative
parties and barred “professional plaintiffs” by stating that “a person may
be a lead plaintiff, or an officer, director, or fiduciary of a lead plaintiff, in
no more than 5 securities class actions brought as plaintiff class actions . .
. during any 3-year period.”275 The Act also expressly limits payment to a

270. H.R. REP. NO. 104-50, at 16 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (quoting William P. Barrett, I
Have No Clients, FORBES, Oct. 11, 1993, at 52 (referring to class-action lawyer William
Lerach)), available at http://bit.ly/2muDGna.
271. See Neil Weinberg, Shakedown Street, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2008, 5:54 PM),
http://bit.ly/2lHINQt; see also Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality, 34 J. CORP. L. 153,
157 (2008).
272. See CPR 44.2(2)(a) (Eng.).
273. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
274. See id.
275. Id. § 27(a)(3)(B)(vi) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi)
(2012)).
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representative party, through final judgment or settlement, to the amount
that would be awarded to any other class members,276 removing some of
the financial incentive for someone trying to serve as a repeat plaintiff.
The Act further provided for mandatory sanctions and a presumption in
favor of fee-shifting where a party or attorney files a meritless or
unfounded complaint in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.277
The purpose of Rule 11 is to deter meritless pleadings and motions by
clarifying that filing alone constitutes a certification that there is a basis in
law and fact for the pleading or motion, and that it is not being presented
for an improper purpose.278 While Rule 11 has its own discretionary
sanctions provision,279 the PSLRA mandatory provision amplified the
force of the Rule.
The Securities Class Action Clearinghouse began monitoring the
filing of federal securities class actions in 1996, following passage of the
PSLRA.280 The Clearinghouse recorded a dip in filing immediately after
the passage of the Act, with only 110 federal securities class actions filed
in 1996.281 Since then, however, that number has generally tracked
upwards. In 2017, 412 actions were filed, while 402 were filed the
following year. 282 The 402 figure for 2018 is approximately 99% higher
than the average number of filings for each year between 1997 and 2017.283
Approximately 200 securities actions have already been filed so far in
2019, putting filings on track with the high totals reached in recent
years.284 Here’s an interesting data point: apparently, only three law firms
are responsible for over half of all securities class action filings in recent
years, and these same law firms have consistently had higher than average
dismissal rates.285 So while the PSLRA took significant steps toward
reducing the incidence of abusive securities fraud litigation, there is reason
to be concerned that such litigation is again on the rise.286
In order to more effectively resolve the problem of strike suits being
filed in the U.S., in the securities field and in others, we may be well276. See id. § 21D(a)(2)(A)(vi) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2012)).
277. See id. § 21D(c)(2)–(3) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(2)–(3)
(2012)).
278. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
279. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
280. See Stanford Law Sch., About Us, SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://stanford.io/2kEymwT (last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
281. Clearinghouse Filings 1996–YTD, supra note 7.
282. See id.
283. See id.; see also Clearinghouse 2018 Year in Review, supra note 269, at 5.
284. See Clearinghouse Filings 1996–YTD, supra note 7.
285. See Clearinghouse 2018 Year in Review, supra note 269, at 36–37.
286. See also Klonoff, supra note 23, at 1589 (“There is a simple reason why
securities fraud class actions have not been severely impacted by the overall decline in
class actions: They are highly suitable for class certification.”).
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advised to take a leaf from the English litigation handbook. The summary
judgment process in the U.S. is an effective method of weeding out clearly
meritless putative class actions. The process is less effective, though, in
protecting defendants where it takes place only years after the filing of a
putative class action and only after significant and costly discovery has
taken place.287 Expedited proceedings for unfounded class claims may
help to resolve this process. U.S. jurists and legislators may also consider
revising the class certification procedure to include an express
consideration of the merits of a claim. Expediting class certification could
also then protect defendants from meritless strike suits.
Although it would be a radical change, U.S. courts might consider
moving toward shifting defense costs to professional class action filers
who repeatedly file weak or unfounded putative class actions.288 This
procedure proved somewhat successful, at least for a limited time, in the
securities context under the PSLRA. In general, we in the U.S. are hesitant
about shifting costs from companies to individual plaintiffs who may be
attempting in good faith to secure relief. Yet courts cannot sit idly by while
defendants, usually corporate defendants (which, I realize, do not
ordinarily engender much sympathy), are forced to absorb significant
defense costs to defend against unfounded claims. Almost always, those
costs are passed on to consumers—as businesses make market
adjustments, and as counsel enjoy windfalls without consequence.289
E.

Class Action Waivers

Finally, an issue that has in recent years been a hot topic in the field
of U.S. class actions is the class action waiver. These waivers are often
coupled with arbitration agreements, especially in employment
contracts,290 and they effectively prevent employees subject to the
agreements both from litigating their claims in court and from pursuing
any form of class-based relief.291 What is even more concerning is the use

287. See GRYPHON, supra note 262, at 11 (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys in the United States
bury defendants in onerous discovery requests, knowing that their clients bear none of the
costs of document production; the cost of discovery itself increases cases’ settlement
value.”).
288. See id. at 7 (“[T]here is a broad consensus that a loser-pays rule would reduce
the number of nuisance suits.”).
289. See id. at 3.
290. See Klonoff, supra note 23, at 1595.
291. See Judith Resnik, A2J/A2K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and
Economic Inequalities in Open Courts and Arbitrations, 96 N.C. L. REV. 605, 609 (2018)
(“These clauses (inserted in job applications and consumer product information) typically
mandate that if disputes arise, claimants may not pursue their rights in courts but can only
proceed, single-file, in dispute resolution systems designated by employers or
manufacturers.”).
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of class action waivers in standard-form consumer contracts.292 By their
nature, class action waivers prevent individuals from realizing the
efficiency and cost-saving advantages of collective action. Two academics
have suggested that companies that use these waivers are essentially
“engaging in ‘do-it-yourself tort reform,’ freeing themselves from liability
without having to convince legislatures to change the substantive law.”293
Individuals may well be dissuaded from bringing an action at all if
the costs of litigating a claim are beyond the means of one person alone.
In the 2011 case of AT&T v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that
arbitration and consumer class action waiver provisions used by AT&T in
a consumer context were enforceable.294 In that case, the plaintiffs raised
claims of fraud and false advertising against AT&T, but an individual
customer’s damages amounted to only $30.22.295 Such a low amount
would generally make litigation cost-prohibitive on an individual basis.
Judge Posner may have said it best when he observed that, “only a lunatic
or a fanatic sues for $30.”296 Applying a class action waiver to these types
of claims will likely result in the vast majority of them not being pursued.
As explained by one leading class action expert, in these types of claims,
“the class members have no practical remedy without a class action” and
“[w]ithout the class action device, a company or individual could cause
small harm to many people, knowing that the costs of bringing individual
suits would be too great to warrant hiring an attorney and filing a
lawsuit.”297 Class action waivers have the potential to significantly reduce
the benefits of the liberal U.S. class action system, and they are becoming
increasingly prevalent.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T v. Concepcion, only 316
claims were filed in arbitration against AT&T between 2014 and 2017.298
Compare that to AT&T’s customer base of 147 million during the same
period.299 The author of the report compiling this data concluded: “In short,
almost no one turns to the self-proclaimed ‘effective’ method of redress
that companies have imposed.”300
292. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011); see
also Klonoff, supra note 23, at 1596 (“By 2026, arbitration clauses barring class actions
(either in litigation or in arbitration) are likely to be common in both the consumer and
employment areas.”).
293. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth T. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 103 (2004).
294. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346–47.
295. See id.
296. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
297. Klonoff, supra note 148, at 815–16.
298. See Resnik, supra note 291, at 650.
299. See id.
300. Id. at 652; see also Lauren Guth Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements and Class Action Waivers Undermine Consumer Rights and Why We Need
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Not surprisingly, corporations favor the class action waiver. As one
academic has put it, “[a] corporate defendant can limit its liability, or
escape it altogether, through negating the power of the class and its
combined resources.”301 Indeed, in the 2018 survey of 400 companies
previously cited, nearly 50% of the companies surveyed responded that
they included class action waivers in their arbitration agreements.302 And
in 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court again affirmed the legality of such a
practice, holding that arbitration agreements including a collective action
waiver must be enforced as written.303
So far, it appears that class action waivers have not secured a foothold
here in England and Wales—at least not nearly to the extent that they have
in the U.S.304 But courts may very well enforce an arbitration agreement
to prevent an individual from joining a GLO or even to prevent a class
member from obtaining damages based on CAT collective proceedings.305
Unlike the other class action problems I’ve identified, the U.S.
system has yet to adopt any measure addressing the class action waiver
issue. While these waivers impair use of the class action device, it is not
even clear that they should be considered an “issue” requiring correction.
Not all class action waivers are alike, and they inevitably present questions
of freedom of contract, unconscionability, and public policy. Yet they
clearly place at odds the right to contract, along with the enforceability of
Congress to Act, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 337 (2015) (“Very few individuals file
arbitration cases.”).
301. Nicole Allyson Chamberlain, Contracting-Out of Class Action Litigation:
Lessons from the United States, 3 N.Z. L. REV. 371, 378 (2018).
302. CARLTON FIELDS, supra note 258, at 38.
303. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018); see also Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238–39 (2013) (holding that a class
action waiver in an arbitration clause is enforceable even if the result is that low-value
claims cannot be brought economically); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
333, 352 (2011) (holding that state rule prohibiting class action waivers in arbitration
agreements as unconscionable is preempted by federal law).
304. See Gregg Rowan et al., Class and Collective Actions in the UK, LEXOLOGY
(Oct. 26, 2018), https://bit.ly/2kMwVMP (“Class-action waivers are not commonly used
in England and Wales, as they are (for example) in the United States.”).
305. See id. (“[I]n principle, it seems likely that an English court would uphold an
arbitration agreement to prevent a claimant joining an action which is proceeding under a
group litigation order (which is an opt-in rather than opt-out mechanism) where that
claimant’s claim is the subject of a valid arbitration agreement. It remains untested whether
a class-action waiver in an arbitration clause would be effective to prevent a class member
claiming an entitlement to damages following a judgment or settlement in opt-out
collective proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal, where the claims pursued
in the collective proceedings fell within the arbitration clause.”); see also Jamie Maples et
al., United Kingdom Class Actions, GETTING DEAL THROUGH, https://bit.ly/2lNw3rz (last
visited Sept. 22, 2019) (“If a party participates in a collective action in breach of an
arbitration clause, the court will almost certainly enforce the arbitration clause. Arbitral
tribunals have limited powers to consolidate proceedings in the absence of the consent of
the parties. Accordingly, to the extent collective actions are permitted within arbitration at
all, it is on an opt-in basis.”).
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arbitration clauses, and the liberal class action system in the U.S. Some
have even gone so far as to opine that the Supreme Court’s class action
waiver decisions “will be the end of class actions in the United States.”306
So far, the U.S. Supreme Court seems to lean in favor of arbitration
provisions,307 but both courts and practitioners should be aware of these
conflicting interests.
Given the Supreme Court’s decisions on class action waivers,
Congress is perhaps in the best position to make any changes regarding
the practice.308 Yet so far, Congress’s most significant action on the topic
has been in favor of waivers. In 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau issued a final rule that would have prohibited some providers of
consumer financial products from using arbitration agreements to bar class
actions.309 Before the rule could go into effect, Congress disapproved it via
a joint resolution under the Congressional Review Act, and the President
signed that joint resolution into law.310
Recently, employees in some industries have begun to organize
against the practice of class action waivers, asserting their right to
collective action and challenging boilerplate contract terms that impair that
right.311 In 2014, backlash from a broad consumer arbitration provision on
General Mills’ website—including letters to Congress stating “Trix don’t
belong in the fine print”—resulted in the company removing the
arbitration clause.312 So action outside of the judicial process may be an
effective way, at least for now, of challenging class action waivers.313 Of
this I am certain: challenges to the class action waiver are by no means a
thing of the past.

306. Chamberlain, supra note 301, at 378.
307. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1632; AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 352.
308. Others agree. See, e.g., Klonoff, supra note 148, at 830 (“[T]he only viable
approach to address [the Supreme Court’s class action waiver rulings] is through
legislation. A rule change will not work.”); Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 293, at 103
(“[A]s a matter of fairness, efficiency, and justice, Congress should prevent companies
from exempting themselves from class action liability.”).
309. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040).
310. Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017).
311. See Gerrit De Vynck & Josh Eidelson, Google Will Stop Making Employees
Waive Class Action Rights, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2019, 10:05 PM),
https://bloom.bg/2klXPeu; see also Dave Simpson, Google to End Forced Work
Arbitration, Class Action Waiver, LAW360 (Feb. 21, 2019, 9:15 PM),
https://bit.ly/2knkDdS.
312. Barnes, supra note 300, at 348–49.
313. See id. at 352 (“Increasing public education of and agitation by consumers
around the harms of mandatory arbitration agreements and class action bans is key.”).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS

Let me conclude by admitting that nerdy class action junkies like me
are comparatively few. I teach the subject. I’ve written on the subject. And
I continue to be intrigued by the dynamics and the efficiencies of the class
action device. It is indeed, as Dick Posner has described it, “an ingenious
procedural innovation.” No country outside of the U.S. has sought to
exactly replicate it. And that may work to the advantage of those legal
systems that are only now developing procedures that permit the
aggregation of claims.
The collective action system here in England and Wales is still in its
early stages. I’ve talked about its several forms. As jurists and litigants
experiment with these new procedural devices, particularly the CAT
collective action, it makes sense to look to the United States and learn from
our experiences—both good and bad; both the efficiencies and the
excesses. We in the U.S. may similarly be well advised to look to both
new and old aspects of the English system and consider adopting those
elements that would translate across the Atlantic in a way that could
improve our class action model. As with all of life, we learn from one
another.

